20 August, 2016

FAQ – God’s Will.



Q. 1. “What is this idea in contemporary theology of God possessing ‘two wills’?”

[Some] teach that God has two wills, the first of which is eternal, unchangeable, and sovereign (irresistible); the second of which is changeable, resistible, and temporary, contradicting the first will of God. They say that God does eternally choose some to salvation in Jesus Christ; that is, he wills their salvation. However, so it is said, God also wills the salvation of all men, because he expresses in the preaching of the gospel a desire (will) that all men be saved. According to this teaching, God wills (in the gospel) and doesn’t will (in predestination) the salvation of some. And insofar as he does will the salvation of all in the preaching, that will is never fulfilled, is only for the here and now and not for eternity, and is incomplete and unfulfilled. (Rev. Ronald Hanko, “Doctrine According to Godliness,” pp. 78-79.)

Those who hold to a free offer and still want to retain some semblance of being Calvinistic and Reformed make a distinction … between the will of God’s decree and the will of His command; or, as is sometimes said, between God’s decretive will and His preceptive will. According to this strange notion, God’s decretive will purposes the salvation only of the elect, while God’s preceptive will purposes the salvation of all who hear the gospel. Thus God has two wills that are in direct conflict. (Prof. Herman C. Hanko “The History of the Free Offer,” chapter 11)

There are contemporary Calvinists who hold … that God has two contradictory wills or desires. According to this theory, God in His decretive will desires the salvation of only the elect, but in His preceptive will desires the salvation of all sinners. (British Reformed Journal, Issue 9 [January - March 1995], pp. 24-25.)

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Q. 2. “How can God both desire and not desire the same thing?”

The conflict is so obvious that even the supporters of this view (and their number is legion) find it a bit difficult to swallow. So in justification of this, they fall back on a sort of last line of defense and plead “apparent contradiction.” They piously assure us (and it sounds truly pious) that God’s ways are so much higher than our ways that we cannot fathom them. What to us seems to be contradictory, to God is a perfect harmony. All we can do is hold the two apparently contradictory propositions in proper tension. (Prof. Herman C. Hanko “The History of the Free Offer,” chapter 11.)

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Q. 3. “What is your objection to this idea of two wills in God?”

We object to this teaching, because it says that God’s will, and therefore God himself, is incomplete, unfulfilled, changeable, resistible (not sovereign), and temporary. It says that there is contradiction (imperfection) in God. It even teaches that he is not one, but two, since he is of two minds about things. All of this denies that God is really God.
Scripture teaches that God has one will and that he accomplishes everything he wills. Psalm 115:3 and Psalm 135:56 plainly teach this in the context of some powerful statements about idolatry. To say that God does not do all his will—that his will can remain incomplete and unfulfilled—is to say that he is not God and thus to commit the sin of idolatry. (Rev. Ronald Hanko, “Doctrine According to Godliness,” p. 79.)

The most obvious fallacy involved with this is the violence it does to God’s character in saying that He is subject to divine schizophrenia (New Latin, “split mind”), and to the character of God’s special revelation in saying that it does not give an adequate or even true picture of “the way things really are” as God decrees them. Furthermore, the fact that God wills the salvation of only some is revealed in His preceptive will (or else we would not know about it), and that we have a special revelation or preceptive will at all is due to the fact that it is contained in God’s decretive will. (British Reformed Journal, Issue 9 [January - March 1995], pp. 24-25.)

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Q. 4. “Why cannot one hold and believe two apparently contradictory propositions at the same time? (e.g. God desires the salvation of all men, and God does not desire the salvation of all men)”

[It] ought to be apparent to all that this sort of argumentation ultimately leads to theological skepticism. If there is contradiction possible at such a critical juncture of the truth, then there is contradiction possible at any juncture of the truth. Then man can be both totally depraved and relatively good. Then grace is both resistible and irresistible. Then God is both triune and not triune. Then justification is both by faith alone and also by faith and works. Then the atonement of Christ is both efficacious and ineffectual. And so one can go on. But this makes any knowledge of the truth impossible and mires one in the slime of subjectivism and skepticism. (Prof. Herman C. Hanko “The History of the Free Offer,” chapter 11)

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Q. 5. “What is the judgment upon this idea of two distinct but contradictory wills in God?”

[This] doctrine of two wills in God is an invention. Any Reformer, including Calvin, who reprobated the idea in the strongest possible terms, has never held it. It is sheer human invention that masks an attempt to be both Arminian and Reformed at the same time. (Prof. Herman C. Hanko “The History of the Free Offer,” chapter 11)

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Q. 6. “How do we rectify this problem? Is there any validity at all in making distinctions within the will of God between His decrees and His precepts/commandments?”

This does not mean that the distinction itself is not valid. It is certainly true that Scripture indicates to us that, within the one will of God, we may distinguish between God’s will of decree and God’s will of precept. The danger of evil enters when we set these two over against each other in such a way that these two not only indicate two separate wills of God, but two wills which are in conflict with each other. (Prof. Herman C. Hanko “The History of the Free Offer,” chapter 11)

The proper distinction is rather between God’s will of decree (which deals with the indicative—what we will do) and His will of command (which deals with the imperative—what we ought to do). The use of grammatical terms at this point is deliberate. Those who hold to two different and differing wills and desires in God usually violate a simple law of logic in their exegesis by making indicative inferences from imperative sentences.  (British Reformed Journal, Issue 9 [January - March 1995], pp. 24-25.)

This distinction between a decretive and a revealed (or preceptive) will of God is both sound and necessary, and one to which all orthodox Calvinistic divines have had recourse. To quote Francis Turretin: “The first and principal distinction is that of the decretive and preceptive will of God ... The former relates to the futurition and the event of things and is the rule of God’s external acts; the latter is concerned with precepts and promises and is the rule of our action.” (Matthew Winzer, “Murray on the Free Offer,” quoting Francis Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology Volume 1 (Phillipsburg, New Jersey: P&R Publishing, 1992), p. 220. C.f. John Owen, Works Volume 10 (Edinburgh: The Banner of Truth Trust, 1987), p. 45, for a similar but fuller treatment of the distinction.)
                                                                                                                                    
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Q. 7. “How should we interpret the proper view of the “two wills” of God in the light of the Scriptural truth that God only has one divine will?”

These “two wills” must be seen as different aspects of the same simple will and desire of God, and both are equally concerned with the conversion of the elect and the hardening of the reprobate (as with Pharaoh). (British Reformed Journal, Issue 9 [January - March 1995], pp. 24-25.)

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Q. 8. “Does not even the proper distinction between Gods “will of decree” and “will of command” imply that God has two wills?”

Such a distinction must never be understood as implying that God has two wills. For it is clear from the above definition that the word will is being used in two different senses, i.e., equivocally, having two distinct points of reference. (Rev. Matthew Winzer, “Murray on the Free Offer: A Review”)

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Q. 9. “You say that only the ‘will of decree’ is the will of God in the proper sense of the term as an act of volition. Is there historical support for that?”

Samuel Rutherford expresses this well in his own inimitable manner:


… that voluntas signi, in which God reveals what is our duty, and what we ought to do, not what is his decree, or what he either will, or ought to do, is not God’s will properly, but by a figure only; for commands, and promises, and threatenings revealed argue not the will and purpose, decree or intention of God, which are properly his will. (Samuel Rutherford, Christ Dying and Drawing Sinners to Himself (Glasgow: Samuel and Archibald Gardner, 1803), p. 480.)

The will of precept has no volitional content, for it simply states what God has commanded ought to be done by man. Whether man wills to do it is absolutely dependent upon whether God has decreed that he shall do it. So it is quite inappropriate to say that God wills something to be with reference to His will of command, for the preceptive will never pertains to the futurition of actions, only to the obligation of them.

(Matthew Winzer, “Murray on the Free Offer: A Review”)






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