Prof. Herman C. Hanko
We have come now to the
conclusion of the matter, and there is little need to be lengthy. Our
examination of the whole question of Beza’s significant departure from the
teachings of Calvin on predestination have been looked at from many different
points of view, and our conclusion is that the charge lodged against Beza is
false.
This is not to say that
no differences can be found between the two; we have noticed some of them. And
Muller150 is correct when he says that there is no significant
difference in Beza’s theology from that of Calvin. Yet, noting what differences
do exist, he says:
Beza’s
predestinarianism, therefore, balances the two foundational issues, the divine
will and the problem of original sin, found in the medieval scholastic paradigm
but moves toward integration or resolution of these themes more on the side of
the divine will and the problem of necessity than did Calvin, which is to say,
with a strong reliance on the scholastic paradigm than on its original Augustinian
model ...
Nevertheless,
subsequent to such rigidly causal argumentation Beza can, much like Calvin,
argue that reprobation can never be completely coordinate with election. The
decree to save the elect and the decree to damn the reprobate are manifestly
distinct in their execution: the former rests upon the faithful apprehension of
Christ while the latter rests upon the sin of the reprobate and its fruits.
Thus, the one decree of God is known in the elect as most merciful and in the
reprobate as most just.
The point Muller makes in the last
paragraph quoted is important. The key words for our purposes are: “much like
Calvin.” Both taught principally the same view. Both taught that election and
reprobation are sovereign and rooted in “one decree.”151 Both also
taught that the two decrees are not “equally ultimate.”152 But both
understood that although the two are not coordinate, they are both sovereign.
And, finally, both taught that election and reprobation were manifestations of
God’s virtues; thus both held to what is sometimes rather scornfully called, “attribute
theology."
A prima
facie case against the position that Beza altered substantially Calvin’s
view can be made. It would seem that such a position rests upon the assumption
that either Calvin did not know what Beza’s view on predestination actually
was, or that, knowing, Calvin did not care. The latter is refuted by the fact
that Calvin considered the truth of predestination so important t0 the truth of
God’s Word that he would, as in the Bolsec case, suffer banishment from Geneva
in its defense. If it is true that Calvin attached so much importance to it,
the idea that he knew of Beza’s differences, differences so great that they
altered all subsequent thought on the matter, but did not care about it is
false.
The former assumption, while it is
sometimes argued that Beza did not really show his hand until after Calvin’s
death, is refuted by a letter sent to Calvin by Beza on July 25, 1555 in which
he acquaints Calvin with his views on this subject and states them in the same
manner in which he stated them after Calvin’s death.153
The point surely is that Calvin would
never have appointed Beza as his successor in the Academy at Geneva if what is
charged against Beza is true. But the fact is that all the evidence points in a
different direction.
Nor did either Calvin or Beza deny the
judicial aspect of reprobation. Just as man remains accountable for his own sin
and just as God can in no way be made morally culpable for man’s sin, so man goes
to hell because of that sin and his unbelief. His judgment is just. His eternal
condemnation is right and in keeping with God’s holiness. But no emphasis on
this judicial aspect of reprobation must take away from the fact that God is
also sovereign.154
Thus we may conclude that Calvin,
Beza, and the whole Reformed and Presbyterian tradition, in so far as it has
held to this doctrine, are one. We agree with John Murray155 who
writes in a chapter entitled. “Calvin, Dordt, and Westminster on Predestination:
A Comparative Study”:
On the
distinction between the sovereign and judicial elements in foreordination to
death Calvin is likewise cognizant. He draws the distinction in terms of the
difference between “the highest cause” (suprema causa) and “the proximate
cause” (propinqua causa). The highest cause is “the secret predestination of
God” and the proximate cause is that “we are all cursed in Adam.” “But as the
secret predestination of God is above every cause, so the corruption and
wickedness of the ungodly affords a ground and provides the occasion for the
judgments of God.” Thus for Calvin, as for Dordt and Westminster, the reason for discriminating is the “bare
and simple good pleasure of God” (ad Rom. 9:11) and the ground of damnation is the sin of the reprobate, a damnation to
which they have been destined by the will of God (cf. ad Rom. 9:20).
It will be
admitted that in “the decree of reprobation” the doctrine of God’s absolute
predestination comes to sharpest focus and expression. On this crucial issue,
therefore, Calvin, Dordt, and Westminster are at one. The terms of expression
differ, as we might expect … But the doctrine is the same and this fact
demonstrates the undissenting unity of thought on a tenet of faith that is a
distinguishing mark of our Reformed heritage and without which the witness to
the sovereignty of God and to His revealed counsel suffers eclipse at the point
where it must jealously be maintained. For the glory of God is the issue at stake.
Those who are faithful to Dordt and
Westminster—and the whole line of Reformed and Presbyterian theology—may be assured
that they stand also in the tradition of Calvin.
----------------
FOOTNOTES:
150. Muller, op.
cit., pp. 86, 88.
151. Cf. also Canons
I, 6 which speaks of election and reprobation as being one decree.
152. It has often been charged that the view of
sovereign election and reprobation make the two decrees ultimate. See Berkouwer,
Daane, et. al. The Canons are said by Daane to reject equal
ultimacy by the eodum modo clause
found in the Conclusion. While this is true, Daane goes on to argue that this
rejection of equal ultimacy also means that the Canons reject sovereign reprobation. See my paper prepared for Dr.
Plantinga, Predestination and Equal
Ultimacy. Boer, while being equally opposed to reprobation, interprets the Canons correctly, but wants the entire doctrine
excised from the Canons as being
contrary to Scripture.
153. See material translated by Philip Holtrop,
pp. 11, 12.
154. Students of Calvin may find it difficult to
harmonize these two and understand how these two stand related to each other,
but not only did Calvin and Beza teach this, it stands in the whole tradition
of Reformed thought. I have addressed myself to this question, though briefly,
in the paper referred to above and in another paper, “Is Article XIV of the Belgic Confession Deterministic?”
155. P. Y. DeJong, ed., Crisis in the Reformed Churches (Grand Rapids: Reformed Fellowship,
1968). pp. 156. 157.
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