Prof. Herman C. Hanko
[Source: Protestant Reformed Theological Journal, April 1989]
In
an earlier article in the Journal we
described the problem which this series addresses: Were Calvin’s views of
predestination significantly altered by Beza and subsequent Reformed and Presbyterian
theologians? This point is often argued by students of Calvin. We examined
first of all the question from the point of view of some who argue that not
Beza, but Calvin himself altered his views on predestination in the course of his
life. Some argue this from an analysis of the different places Calvin treats the
doctrine of predestination in various editions of his Institutes. Others argue this position from a comparison of Calvin’s
Institutes and his polemical
writings, particularly the writings which emerged from his controversy with
Bolsec, a bitter opponent of predestination. We showed that these arguments are
without foundation. In the last article in the Journal we began a discussion of the question: Did Theodore Beza
modify or change Calvin’s views on predestination? We described the arguments
which are raised in support of this position. In this article we want to offer
an analysis of the issues before, in a future article, we compare the views of
Calvin and Beza on the truth of predestination. As we wrote earlier, we are
convinced that Calvin himself did not alter his views, but we are equally
convinced that Beza made no substantive changes in Calvin’s position. It is clear
from the evidence that those who argue for such changes are really enemies of
predestination and are attempting to bolster their attack against the doctrine
by appealing (though without foundation) to important differences between
Calvin and his successor in Geneva.
*
* * * *
* * *
* * *
We intend to answer the questions
posed in the concluding paragraphs of the last chapter in two sections. In the
first section we will analyze the issues involved and attempt to come to some
clarification and evaluation of them. This will be done in this chapter. In the
next chapter we will compare the views on predestination as presented in the
writings of Calvin and Beza and examine any possible differences in these views.
We turn then, first of all, to an
analysis of the issues.
We are not persuaded that Calvin
himself altered his views on predestination during his own lifetime. Neither
the different places in which he treated the doctrine in subsequent editions of
the Institutes nor a comparison of
his views as developed in the Institutes
and in his later polemical writings gives evidence of this.
That no alteration in his views can be
deduced from a change of place in the treatment of the doctrine in the Institutes is evident from the following
considerations.
1) Calvin himself nowhere tells us the
reason for this change of place. Brilliant thinker that he was, one would
almost expect that should Calvin have changed the place of treatment because he
modified his views on predestination in subsequent editions, he would almost
certainly have given his reasons for doing so.
2) Almost all students of Calvin agree
that Calvin’s theology, while it went through some process of development, was
nevertheless present in germinal form at a very early stage of his post-conversion
life. Schaff62 writes:
Calvin did not
grow before the public, like Luther and Melanchthon, who passed through many
doctrinal changes and contradictions. He adhered to the religious views of his
youth unto the end of his life. His Institutes
came like Minerva in full panoply out of the head of Jupiter. The book was
greatly enlarged and improved in form, but remained the same in substance
through the several editions.
3) Although it is true that Calvin did
not treat his doctrine of predestination till later in his Institutes nevertheless the doctrine is repeatedly mentioned almost
from the outset. In fact, so all-pervasive is this truth in the body of the Institutes that not one doctrine is
discussed apart from it. Although, in every instance, the terms themselves may
not be specifically mentioned, the doctrine is clearly implied. One can hardly
read a single page without finding some reference to this truth. We cannot take
the time or space to prove this point. We call attention only to the following.
Already in his treatment of the
knowledge of God, Calvin refers to the sovereign distinction God makes among
men.63 In the next paragraph Calvin speaks of the impious as being
reprobate.
In his treatment of Scripture, Calvin
repeatedly stresses that the true knowledge of the Scriptures is given only to
the e1ect.64
Calvin applies the truth of predestination
even to the angelic world.65
In dealing with the doctrine of
providence he discusses the crucial question, so closely connected with
predestination, whether God’s sovereign control extends also to sin. To this he
answers affirmatively.66
In Book II, in connection with his discussion
of the question of free will, Calvin also refers to predestination.67
It is not surprising that Calvin also
treats of this truth in connection with the work of salvation.68 We
have referred to only a few passages where the doctrine of predestination is
referred to or presupposed. A closer investigation of Calvin’s teachings on
this subject must await a later chapter. Our purpose is only to show that there
is no single doctrine of the truth which Calvin discussed which does not
include a mention of predestination. All of these passages appear in the Institutes prior to
Calvin’s actual formal discussion of
the doctrine. It is woven into the warp and woof of all Calvin’s teachings. It
is presupposed in all he writes. It is so completely a part of Calvin’s thought
that he refers to it on every occasion.
Niesel69 is wrong,
therefore, when he says:
Everything
else that Calvin has to say about God, Christ, the appropriation of salvation,
has already been said without any mention
of election (underscoring ours, H.H.) … Calvin could not express himself
more plainly from a formal point of view that the doctrine of election has no
intrinsic significance for theology in the sense that other doctrines might
stem from it.
Bromiley70 comes much
closer to the truth when he admits ignorance as to why Calvin moved the place
of the treatment of predestination in his Institutes
and says: “The crucial role of the doctrine is not at all suggested by its
location.”
Nor does any evidence support the
contention that Calvin altered his views on predestination when he engaged in
polemics with those who opposed his position. We cannot enter into the question
here in detail.71
It is sufficient for our purposes to
point out that the one doctrine of predestination became the object of attack
more than any other. Pighius, Bolsec, Castellio, Trolliet, and Georgias all
attacked it, and their objections which they made against this doctrine were,
strikingly, not only often the same, but also presupposed a view of the
doctrine which many say Calvin did not expound until he actually wrote against
them. We refer, e.g., to the objections that Calvin makes God the Author of
sin, that Calvin denies the activity of the human will, that Calvin destroys
all sense of human responsibility, etc. If men today do not understand what
Calvin taught on predestination in his Institutes,
Calvin’s enemies surely did.
Nor ought it to surprise us that
Calvin’s polemical writings against these attacks included a more fully
developed and more clearly argued doctrine than appears in the Institutes. It stands to reason that as
Calvin came to the defense of this central truth of his theology he would draw
the lines more sharply, develop the doctrine more fully, and express himself
more clearly to answer the objections which were brought against it. But that these
writings make fundamental changes in his theology is an assertion without
warrant. If there is one aspect of Calvin’s thought which is agreed upon by the
majority of scholars it is that throughout his life no essential change can be
detected in Calvin’s own writings.
What about the assertion that Calvin’s
friend and successor, Theodore Beza, altered his views on predestination?
We must clearly understand the
problem. The question is not whether we can detect any different emphasis in
Beza; any slightly different nuance in Beza’s thought; any modification of
Calvin’s approach to this truth. The question is whether Beza so altered
Calvin’s teaching and made such fundamental modifications in Calvin’s view that
the original truth of Calvin was lost and subsequent continental and Puritan
theologians directed into such different channels that what Calvin taught can
no longer really be found in these writings.
This question involves various other
considerations. And to each we give some attention.
In the first place, the question arises
whether a difference is to be found in the writings of Calvin and Beza
concerning the question of infralapsarianism vs. supralapsarianism. It is
maintained by some that while Calvin was more than likely infralapsarian in his
views, Beza took a supralapsarian approach to the doctrine of predestination,
and thus effected a significant change in Calvin’s views. Several observations
have to be made in this connection.
1) In the first place, it is evident
from the writings of those who address themselves to this problem that there is
a great deal of misunderstanding concerning what the issue between infra- and
supralapsarianism actually is. This is somewhat surprising in the light of the
fact that subsequent theologians in the Calvinistic tradition always clearly
defined the issues. And we suspect that the charge of supralapsarianism is
sometimes made rather unthinkingly in an attempt to cast aspersions on the
doctrine of sovereign predestination.
Hagenbach72 speaks of the
Reformed theologians as being supralapsarian when they “maintained that the fall
of man itself was predestinated by God.” With this Fisher73 agrees
when he says that supralapsarianism teaches that: “The Fall itself, the primal
transgression, (is) the object of an efficient decree.” In another work74
he says that supralapsarians “made the final cause or end of the divine
administration to be the manifestation of God’s attributes,—of His justice
in punishing, and of His mercy in saving.” Yet even here he is not consistent,
for he says that the Belgic Confession
makes this same distinction, although from an infralapsarian viewpoint. He
makes another mistake when, in the same book, he makes the astounding assertion
that the Institutes are supra, but
that the Consensus Genevensis is more
moderate.
Bangs75 claims that
supralapsarianism is characterized by making predestination an end in itself.
And Seeburg76 makes the serious mistake of saying that the next
generation of reformers (Beza, Zanchi, Musculus) developed an extreme form of
supralapsarianism which was adopted by the Synod of Dort. Even Berkouwer77
seems to make the mistake of describing the problem in terms of God’s
relationship to the fall, rather than in terms of the relationship between the
decrees.
Although it is beyond the scope of
this discussion to enter into this subject, it is important to understand that
the historic question between supra- and infralapsarianism is a question of the
relation between God’s eternal decrees.
The infralapsarians maintain that the decree
of the fall precedes the decree of
salvation in Christ, while the supralapsarians maintain that the decree of salvation precedes the decree of the fall. And, because no time
element may be interjected into the eternal counsel of God, the question is one
of the logical relation between the
two decrees. That is, does God elect His church from out of a fallen human
race? or does God decree the fall as a means to accomplish the decree of
election?
2) If the problem is understood in
this light, then the question is not easily answered. The simple fact of the
matter is that, as Cunningham78 and Hunter79 observe,
Calvin did not even consciously face the problem. Hunter80 says:
Calvin
himself, ever imbued with practical religious aims and dogmatic only when
authorized by Scripture, seems to have given the question little definite
thought. His position is certainly sufficiently undefined to allow of both
parties claiming him as sponsor for their view. He professed to have a hearty
dislike for subtleties, as he once told Beza, and this was essentially the kind
of matter over which he would be indisposed to waste time. Logical he was, but
logic became an irrelevancy and irreverence when it attempted to penetrate
audaciously into the realm of ultimate divine mysteries. So little importance
did he appear to attach to the question that he subscribed to and indeed inspired
two Confessions whose terms might bear a contrary significance in regard to
this point. The Consensus Genevensis
(1552) assumes the supralapsarian view, while the French Confession, of which Calvin was practically the author, is
infralapsarian in affirming that God chose out of the universal corruption and
damnation in which all men were submerged some to eternal life. Cunningham
stoutly asserts that the latter more truly represents the Reformer’s real
opinion, yet it is significant that Beza, who so largely echoed Calvin, was a
supralapsarian.
While one cannot agree with everything
which Hunter says concerning Calvin, it is clear that any attempt to force
Calvin into one or the other mold is to become guilty of anachronism.
The conclusion is, therefore, that
while it perhaps cannot be determined with certainty whether Calvin was
infralapsarian or supralapsarian, Beza’s supralapsarianism did not make such
significant changes in Calvin’s views so that the course of Reformed theology
was altered. What Hunter says in the above quote is undoubtedly true. And his
assertion that Beza, also in the matter of supralapsarianism, was an echo of
Calvin is our conclusion as well.
Perhaps a more serious charge against
Beza is the claim that Beza “scholasticized” Calvin’s theology. Also in a
consideration of this charge several points must be considered.
1) A major question, quite obviously,
is: What precisely is meant by scholasticism? Of what was Beza guilty when he
allegedly “scholasticized” Calvin’s thought?
We do not agree with vanderWalt81
when in an article entitled, “Was Calvin a Calvinist or was/is Calvinism
Calvinistic?” he says, “Calvinism after Calvin’s time was either Scholastic
Calvinism or Reformed Scholasticism—a clear deviation from the
thought of the Reformer of Geneva.”82 As we have already noticed, he
gives six characteristics of such Calvinistic scholasticism: 1) It stresses the
necessity of a logical or doctrinal system. 2) It is strongly dependent on the
philosophy of Aristotle.
3) It lays great stress on reason and
gives reason almost the same status as revelation. 4) It considers the Bible to
be a set of propositions so that a theology may be constructed on its basis. 5)
It distorts faith “to the status of intellectual submission to the truths of
Scripture.”83 6) It “does not only imply a different method of thinking or a different
mentality. It also leads to the achievement of different results of thought
from those of the Reformation.”84
Only the first point has any validity.
To say that Beza depended on the philosophy
of Aristotle is to fly in the face of the repeated condemnation of heathen
philosophers found in his writings. To assert that reason is given almost the
same status as revelation is a mixture of concepts which does not even make
good sense. Reason is a method of knowing, something to be compared with faith.
Revelation is objective and the object of our intellectual and pistic pursuit.
But even then, one can only wonder how such a statement can be made when Beza’s
writings are filled from beginning to end with references to and explanations
of Scripture. To say that the second generation of reformers considered
Scripture to be only a set of propositions is to assert something wholly
without proof, and to ignore the many correct explanations of Scripture which
the reformers made. To call the reformers’ view of faith only intellectual
submission to truth is to denigrate their many writings which emphasize faith’s
spiritual character. If this is what is meant by a scholasticizing of Calvin,
it is false on the face of it.
2) This does not imply that Beza had
no use for Aristotle at all. Carl Bangs85 quotes a letter from Beza
to Ramus in which he gives his reasons why Ramus’ application to teach in the
Academy is being rejected. Beza writes:
The second
obstacle lies in our determination to follow the position of Aristotle, without
deviating a line, be it in logic or in the rest of our studies.86
It is clear from this statement of
Beza that in some respects the Academy made use of some of Aristotle’s thought.
However, the question of what use particularly was made of it is important.
From this quote as well as from the writings of post-Calvin theologians it
becomes apparent that the scholastic method which they followed was a method
which 1) Attempted to construct a unified and systematic theology; 2) Made use
of Aristotelian logic in accomplishing this; 3) Made use of a method which
raised questions and answered them, raised objections against doctrines and analysed
them carefully while bringing to bear upon them the Scriptural data; 4) Made
use of many distinctions within concepts to bring out their truth more clearly.
3) Whether this was in fact a
scholasticizing of Calvin’s thought of such magnitude that it altered Calvin’s
theology is another question. Various considerations must be taken into account
to answer this.
a) The use of Aristotelian logic in
itself cannot be a priorily
considered unBiblical. While it would not be within the scope of this study to enter
into this question in detail, it must be remembered that logic as a system of
rules which guide right thinking is a neutral subject, analogous to
mathematics.87 The application of such principles of logic to
thinking, even theologically, cannot be wrong.
b) The scholastics of the medieval
times not only incorporated into their theology Aristotelian logic, but
attempted in many respects to marry Aristotelian philosophy with theology. This
the Reformers not only did not do, but they fiercely reprobated it in their
writings.
c) The goal of the post-Reformation
theologians was to construct a logically coherent system of theology. They did
this in full recognition of the fact that the revelation of the truth of God in
the Scriptures, just because it is revelation, constitutes an organic whole.
The organic unity of this revelation implies that the individual parts of it
are related to each other, and that that relation is a logical one. The
application of logical categories to the system which they constructed is not
to be construed, therefore, as an innovative technique which, by virtue of its
application, necessarily altered the teachings of Calvin. The case has to be
decided on other grounds. Emile Leonard88 correctly points out that
even Calvin often attempted to force his view of predestination into a logical
mold although we would not, of course, agree with the perjorative term “force.”
Hall89 is wrong when he
writes:
A change of
emphasis came with Beza, [Calvin’s] successor there, who altered the balance of
Calvin’s theology, saw, and in part approved, that successful repristination of
Aristotle among Protestants which led to the Reformed scholasticism that
distorted the Calvin synthesis.
Muller90 is much more
correct. He is careful first of all to define what is meant by these terms.
While we have quoted this before, it is important enough to quote again. He
writes:91
Two terms that
appear most frequently in the evaluation of theology after Calvin are
“scholasticism” and “orthodoxy.” From the first, we need to be clear that these
terms are neither laudatory nor perjorative; they are only descriptive of the
method and the intention of theologians in the century and a half following the
demise of Calvin, Vermigli, and Musculus. In other words, characterization of
post-Reformation Protestantism as “scholastic orthodoxy” denotes the historical
form of that theology and in no way implies that the theology of the
seventeenth century can provide either the right method or the right teaching
for the present.
He then defines scholasticism as
a
methodological approach to theological system which achieves precision of definition
through the analysis of doctrinal loci
in terms of scripture, previous definition (the tradition), and contemporary
debate.92
Orthodoxy, he says, has several
characteristics.
First, and
perhaps foremost, it indicates the desire to set forth the true faith as over
against the teaching of several adversaries confronted in polemic. Right
teaching is for the edification of the church on both the positive and the
polemical levels. Second, “orthodoxy” indicates also a sense of catholicity, of
continuity both with the revelation contained in the scriptural deposit and with
the valid teaching of the church in past centuries. Orthodox theologians of the
seventeenth century felt quite at ease in their use not only of the fathers but
also of medieval thinkers. Third, the term implies a strong relationship between
systematic theology and church confessions, the confessions acting as a
subsidiary norm in the development and exposition of doctrinal systems: even at
its most rigid and formal extreme, orthodoxy is theology in and for the church.
Fourth, and finally, the production of an orthodoxy, so-called, relates to the
conviction that true doctrine can be stated fully and finally in a series of
strict doctrinal determinations. In this sense, orthodoxy involves an approach
to scripture as the deposit of truth out of which correct definitions may be
drawn. This assumption in itself entailed the development of a theological
method more logical, more rigorous, and more rationalistic than that of the
Reformation, though no less committed to the principle of sola scriptura.93
While certainly we do not agree with
every detail of Muller’s analysis, the general point is correct. Muller’s
conclusion is:
We need to be
aware from the outset, therefore, that the question of continuity or
discontinuity of Protestant scholastic theology with the western theological
tradition is highly complex and not at all to be reduced to the relationship of
the doctrine of predestination developed by Beza or Zanchi to that of Calvin.
Rather the question must be raised in terms of the influence of Calvin and his
contemporaries upon a developing Augustinian theology the roots of which extend
into the middle ages, indeed, back to Augustine; in terms also of
methodological continuities and discontinuities both with the Reformers and with
medieval doctrines; and finally in terms of the changes that occur in
theological ideas as they develop systematically, recognizing that continuity
is found in developing traditions rather than in a static reproduction of ideas
from one generation to the next.94
There are two more questions which
must briefly be answered. The first has to do with the main theological
principle of Calvin’s theology; the second has to do with the rationale behind
the assertion that Calvin’s theology was significantly altered by Beza.
The first question has bearing on our
subject in different ways. In a certain sense it stands connected with the
question of the significance of the place Calvin’s treatment of predestination
occupies in the Institutes. But more
to our present point, it has to do with the question of whether predestination
was a subsidiary doctrine in Calvin’s system or whether it occupied a chief and
principle place.
Opinions on this question also differ
from one scholar to another.
In an article entitled “Calvin on
Predestination,” Frank A. James III95 writes:
Past
interpreters of Calvin often fell victim to the misconception that predestination
resided at the center of his theology. However, today most acknowledge that he
never discussed predestination as his most basic presupposition.
However, the same author adds: “Admittedly
he did accord a growing importance to predestination in succeeding editions of
the Institutes,” although, “had it
not been for Pighius and Bolsec, one wonders if Calvin’s name would have been
so closely associated with predestination.”96
Bangs97 very generally
states that Beza lifted the doctrine of predestination to a preeminence which
it did not have for Calvin, although he adds that Beza made predestination an
end in itself.
McKim98 writes that
predestination was not the center of Calvin’s teaching but that he developed it
and accorded a greater importance to it under the influence of Augustine and
Bucer and “under the sway of ecclesiological and pastoral preoccupations rather
than in order to make it a foundation of his theology.”
Somewhat along these same lines, J. I.
Packer99 writes:
Predestination,
the eternal purpose of God concerning grace, is not, as used to be thought, the
focal theme of Calvin’s theology; rather it is the undergirding of the Gospel,
the ultimate explanation of why the Son of God became by incarnation Jesus the
Christ, and whence it is that some who hear the Word come to faith, and how it
is that Christians have a sure hope of heaven.
So also Walker100 says that
“To Calvin election was always primarily a doctrine of Christian comfort.”
Along almost entirely different lines,
James Orr101 says, “Mounting to the throne of God, Calvin reads
everything in the light of the eternal divine decree.”
These conflicting judgments, perhaps
colored by the view the authors themselves take concerning the truth of
predestination, are nevertheless proof that one cannot easily come to any
conclusions on the matter. But there are some writers who give more thoughtful
consideration to the problem and come much closer to what in our judgment is a
correct appraisal.
Even Daniel-Rops,102 though
a Roman Catholic, comes very close to the truth of the matter when he finds
Calvin’s view of predestination rooted in his principle of the absolute glory
of God. John Murray,103 in an article entitled, “Calvin, Dordt, and
Westminster on Predestination—A Comparative Study,” discusses the
importance of reprobation in the thought of all three and then concludes with
the remark:
But the
doctrine is the same and this fact demonstrates the undissenting unity of
thought on a tenet of faith that is a distinguishing mark of our Reformed heritage
and without which the witness to the sovereignty of God and to His revealed
counsel suffer eclipse at the point where it must jealously be maintained. For
the glory of God is the issue at stake.
The point which Murray makes is
particularly important, for he finds that not only did the reformers basically
agree among themselves, but that Dordt and Westminster stand in essential
agreement with the reformers. This is also the position of Polman104
and Warfield.105 The latter writes:
The exact
formulation of the formative principle of Calvinism ... has taxed the acumen of
a long line of distinguished thinkers. Many modes of stating it have been
proposed. Perhaps, after all, however, its simplest statement is best. It lies
then ... in a profound apprehension of God in His majesty, with the poignant
realization which inevitably accompanies this apprehension, of the relation
sustained to God by the creature as such, and particularly by the sinful
creature. The Calvinist is the man who has seen God, and who, having seen God
in His glory, is filled on the one hand, with a sense of his own unworthiness
to stand in God’s sight as a creature, and much more as a sinner, and on the
other hand, with adoring wonder that nevertheless this God is a God who
receives sinners.
The deepest principle of Calvin’s
teaching was the absolute glory of God: soli
Deo gloria. In closest relationship to this principle of God’s glory stands
the truth of God’s absolute sovereignty. God is not only glorious in Himself,
but He reveals His glory in all that He does. If all that He does is a
revelation of His glory, then sovereignty characterizes all His works. God is
the Sovereign Who does all His good pleasure. And this sovereignty must also be
applied to the work of salvation. God is sovereign in saving sinners. He is not
dependent upon them in any respect. But if He is sovereign in the salvation of
sinners, then the truth of sovereign and double predestination follows.
Yet with all this we do not mean to
imply that Calvin, proceeding from the principle of God’s glory, simply argued
rationalistically to the conclusion of predestination. He gleaned what he
taught from the Scriptures, and each doctrine is supported by copious
references to God’s Word. But Calvin also saw the coherence, the unity, the
internal logical relationships between the various doctrines. And thus, insofar
as one can call Calvin’s theology a system, the truths he taught reflected the
organic unity of Scripture itself.
No one will argue that the same is not
true of Beza. When efforts are made to set Beza over against Calvin these
efforts are designed to minimize the importance of predestination in Calvin’s
thinking. But if it is true that the main principle of Calvin’s theology is
God’s glory, as any reading of Calvin’s works will show, then no conflict can
be found between Calvin and his successor in Geneva. Both were men imbued with
a sense of the glory of God. Both sought that glory in everything they did. And
because this was the deepest principle of both, both held with equal firmness
to the doctrine of sovereign predestination.
Closely related to this question
stands also the question of whether Beza’s theology in distinction from
Calvin’s was “decretal.” In a paper delivered on February 10, 1977 at Calvin
Seminary entitled, “Predestination in Calvin, Beza, and Later Reformed
Theology,”106 Prof. P. Holtrop took this position and argued not
only that Beza made basic changes in Calvin’s theology at this point, but that
Beza was the one who influenced all subsequent thought. We quote rather
extensively from this paper in order to demonstrate the point being made.
Thus, decretal
theology, as it comes to be seen in Reformed Orthodoxy, begins at this point;
the absolute pre-historic decree of God now comes to be seen as a necessary
ontological base for everything that happens (deductive theology), and
everything that happens, or exists, is now seen in terms of the essence of God
(immutability; mercy and justice; love and hate seen in aesthetic balance). If
the doctrine of predestination is the “crown of soteriology” for Calvin, it is
the main structure for all theology in Beza.
In that
theology the point of departure is the hidden counsel of God, not the
actualized relation of God and man, the revelation-and-faith correlate, or man
before the face of God. What God has decreed is inviolately executed in history:
that means, for Beza, that we must take our standpoint in God and His decree.
Predestination in Calvin is a support for the assurance of salvation; hence he
looks from sanctification to predestination (observe position of treatment in 1559
Institutes). Calvin’s view is a view
of man to God. But in Beza’s theology that relation is reversed: looking from
God’s predestination of man’s sanctification he remained preoccupied with
predestination for his entire Iife.107
Beza wants his
doctrine to be one of “equal ultimacy”—the results of hardening are as
much a work of God as the results of faith; eternal death is as much decreed by
God as eternal life; there is no disjunction in the mode of decree and election
and reprobation; both redound to the glory of God. Everything is seen as the
unravelling of God’s decree.108
The point of these remarks is that
Holtrop wants to set Beza over against Calvin in the crucial area of
reprobation. That is, he wants to defend the position that Beza altered Calvin’s
theology at the crucial juncture of this aspect of sovereign predestination.
This is important for two reasons. In the first place, if this is true, then
indeed the alteration which Beza made in Calvin’s theology is of such sweeping
importance that indeed Beza can almost be called an opponent of Calvin in this
point. And if Beza so influenced subsequent theology to the extent that it is
claimed, it is surely true that all subsequent theologizing from Beza on, both
in continental and English theology, cannot be said to be faithful to the
genius of the reformer from Geneva, but is rather a perversion of his thought.
It is not our purpose to enter into
this question in detail at this point. We hope to do that in the following
chapter. But, secondly, the importance of this question is closely connected to
various views which in recent times have been promoted within Reformed circles
in connection with the question of sovereign predestination. We refer to the
views of G.C. Berkouwer, J. Daane, H. Boer, and others, men to whom also
Holtrop refers approvingly.109 These and others have attacked
particularly the doctrine of reprobation and have lodged against it criticisms
such as Holtrop makes:
e.g., that the Bezan doctrine makes
election and reprobation equally ultimate; that this conception of
predestination is rooted in decretal theology; etc.
It is not within the scope of our
purpose to answer all these charges nor to deal with such recent criticisms of
sovereign predestination.110 The reason why we bring them up here is
because they stand connected with the question which we are addressing. And, it
is our judgment that much of the effort which is put forth to set Beza and
Calvin at odds with each other is motivated by a desire to deny the doctrine of
reprobation and to try to find some historical justification for this in a
reinterpretation of Calvin which presents him as teaching a modified view of
this doctrine which is quite different from Reformed theology of the present.
It is sufficient to point out at this
juncture only one basic point, the point of revelation. If it is true that all
Scripture is the infallible record of God’s self-revelation (as has been
historically maintained by all Reformed theology since the time of the
Reformation) then it is also true that whatever may be found in Scripture is
the revelation of God. This has crucial consequences for our subject. While
some may speak rather scornfully of “decretal theology,” God’s self-revelation
has implicit in it His own absolute sovereignty. And this sovereignty is the
key to His eternal decrees, according to which He brings all things into
existence and makes all things serve the purpose for which He has made them.
That this should extend to the eternal destination of men surely follows in the
very nature of the case.
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FOOTNOTES:
FOOTNOTES:
62. Philip Schaff, History of the Christian Church, Vol. VIII (Grand Rapids: Wm. B.
Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1953), p. 262.
63. I, 5, vii. The edition which we have used
throughout is the translation of John Allen, 2 volumes (Grand Rapids: Wm. B.
Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1949).
64. See, e.g., I, 7. v.
65. I, 14, 16, 17.
66. I, 16, v-viii. I, 17, 2.
67. See II, 1, xi, xx; II, 3, v, viii.
68. II, 3, x; II, 4, iii, v; II, 5, v; II, 6, iv,
xxi; II, 12, 5; III, 1, ii, xi, xii, xxxi, xxxv.
69. Wilhelm Niesel, The Theology of Calvin, tr. by Harold Knight (Grand Rapids: Baker
Book House), p, 166.
70. Geoffrey W. Bromiley, Historical Theology (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co.,
1978), p. 251.
71. A later examination of Calvin’s writings both
in his Institutes and in his
polemical writings will serve as a basis for the contention we make here.
72. K. R. Hagenbach, A Textbook of the History of Doctrine (New York: Sheldon & Co.,
1861), p. 268.
73. George Park Fisher, The Reformation (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1916). p. 177.
74. History
of Christian Doctrine (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1908), pp. 300, 301.
75. Op. cit., p. 66.
76. Op. cit., pp. 421, 422.
77 Gerrit Berkouwer, Divine Election, tr. by Hugo Bekker (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans
Publishing Co., 1960), p. 263.
78. Op. cit., pp. 366ff.
79. Op. cit., p. 122.
80. Ibid.
81. B. J. vanderWalt, Our Reformation Tradition (Potchefstroom: Institute for Reformation
Studies, 1984).
82. Ibid.,
p. 369.
83. Ibid.,
p. 370.
84. Ibid.
85. Op. cit.,
p. 61.
86. The role Ramus played in the development of
philosophy is an important one, but one into which we cannot here enter.
87. It does not require regeneration and faith to
learn that 4 + 4 = 8 any more than it requires regeneration to know that A
cannot be both A and non-A at the same time in the same sense.
88. Emile G. Leonard, A History of Protestantism, Vol. I (London: Thomas Nelson Ltd.,
1965), p. 302.
89. Duffield, op.
cit., p. 2.
90. Richard A. Muller, Christ and the Decree (Durham: Labyrinth Press, 1986).
91. p. 11.
92. Ibid.,
p. 11.
93. Ibid.,
p. 12.
94. Ibid.,
p. 13.
95. Christian
History, Vol. 5. No. 4, p. 24.
96. Ibid.
97. Op. cit.,
p. 66.
98. Op. cit., p. 161.
99.
Duffield, op. cit., pp. 171, 172.
100. Williston Walker, A History of the Christian Church (New York: Charles Scribner’s
Sons, 1950), p. 393.
101. James Orr, The Progress of Dogma (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1901), p.
291.
102. Op, cit.,
p, 406.
103. P. Y. DeJong, ed., Crisis in the Reformed Churches (Grand Rapids: Reformed Fellowship,
1968), p. 157.
104.
A. D. R. Polman, De Praedestinatieleer
van Augustinus, Thomas vanAquino en Calvijn (Graneker: T. Wever, 1936),
pp. 307ff.
105. B. B. Warfield, Calvin and Augustine (Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing,
1974), p. 491.
106. So far as I know this paper has not been
published, although copies were distributed at the meeting.
107. p. 6.
108. p. 12.
109. In an essay entitled, “Recent Reformed Criticisms
of the Canons,” K. Runia speaks of some of these same questions. P. Y. DeJong, op. cit., pp. 168-171.
110. Some of these matters will be dealt with in
the next chapter and in the Conclusion. We have dealt somewhat in detail with
the problems involved in a paper on the subject: “Predestination and Equal Ultimacy
in Canons I.”
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