Homer
C. Hoeksema
[Source: Protestant
Reformed Theological Journal, vol. 7, no. 2 (May, 1974), pp. 18-40]
[THE
FREEDOM OF GOD: A Study of Election and Pulpit, by James Daane (Grand
Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publ. Co., 1973). 208 pp., $5.95]
In
an introduction to his book, the author informs us that his book deals with the
reasons for an alleged silence of Reformed pulpits on the theme of God’s
gracious election. Concerning this silence the author writes:
When the sound of election is no longer
heard in the pulpits of churches creedally committed to the truth of election,
the situation would appear to warrant an investigation to discover whether the
pulpit or the doctrine is at fault. This book is an effort to uncover the
reason for this strange silence. There are two parts to the answer. One reason
is that Reformed theologians have differed among themselves about election so
profoundly that controversy has often deeply disturbed the churches. In
reaction, for the sake of peace, there has been a tendency to mute the sound of
election in the pulpit. Second, as the truth of God’s election was refined more
and more by influential Reformed theologians, election became increasingly
unpreachable. (p. 6)
It
is with the second of these two reasons that Daane’s book deals chiefly. And he
claims that “the theological features and emphases that rendered election
largely unpreachable” originated “in
the decretal theology of seventeenth-century Protestant scholasticism.” Francis
Turretin is presented throughout the book as the epitome of such “Protestant scholasticism.”
Daane claims that “Reformed decretal theologians generally theologized from a
commonly accepted notion of an all-comprehensive divine decree that ‘accounts
for all that happens in the world.’” He goes on to claim concerning what he
calls throughout his book “decretal
theology” the following:
All
thought that God’s eternal purpose in Christ must be defined within the terms
of God’s all-inclusive decree; the biblically stated eternal divine purpose in
Christ did not, in their thought, decisively determine the nature and purpose
of God’s decree. What God eternally purposed in Christ was left to be defined
in the larger context of another more expansive decree. Whatever disagreements
there were among these theologians occurred only within this basic commitment. (p. 7)
The author then sets forth the purpose
of his book, as follows:
This
book attempts to elucidate the differences between the scholastic view of God’s
decree and the biblical view of God’s eternal purpose as decreed in Christ. We
shall see how the scholastic version of God’s decree governs most of the recent
articulate proponents of Reformed theology and how this persistence of decretal
theology accounts for the pervasive silence concerning the doctrine of election
in Reformed pulpits. Although we shall be looking closely at the theological
statements of some recent exponents of seventeenth-century decretal theology
who demonstrate that such a doctrine of God’s decree cannot be preached, our
chief intent is positive, not critical. Our main concern is to demonstrate that
God’s only decree is the gracious and elective purpose that he in divine
freedom purposed in Jesus Christ, and that this decree can be preached because
it can be believed (Ibid.).
Daane then goes on to claim for his view
the following:
This book projects a view of God’s decree
understood as an act of his freedom in Jesus Christ. It is a view that differs
significantly from the divine decree that scholastic theologians see as formulated
as outside of and antecedent to God’s purpose in Jesus Christ. The scholastic
decree contains and accounts for everything, including sin. The decree of God’s
purpose in Christ does not account for sin but savingly triumphs over it. (pp.
7-8)
And
while the book “makes no pretense to theological finality,” the author claims
for it that “it opens a window on a clearer biblical view of election than that
offered by decretal theology, a
view that can help return election to the pulpit.”
The
little introduction succeeds in setting forth the sum and substance of Daane’s
book. It also succeeds in mentioning just about every point on which this
reviewer finds himself in disagreement with the author and critical of his
book. In Daane’s introduction there is probably but one statement with which
this reviewer can agree. It is the statement of the author “that I have not
probed all the biblical heights and depths of election, nor achieved a
theologically inerrant reflection of the Bible’s teaching about election.” And
in the opinion of this reviewer, this statement is, to say the least, an
understatement. Positively put, Daane has achieved a thoroughly errant view of
election, one that is neither biblical nor Reformed. Moreover, he has produced an
unfair and dishonest caricature of what he calls pejoratively “decretal
theology.” One can recognize in Daane’s book neither the true picture of
“decretal theology” in his description thereof, nor the true, biblical and
Reformed doctrine of election in Daane’s view over against this “decretal
theology.” To criticize Daane’s book in detail would require a book of even
greater length than Daane’s. But such a book would be largely negative and
apologetic, and, in our opinion, not worth writing. In this review we shall try
to summarize as clearly as possible some of our main objections to Daane’s
presentation. We differ, of course, as to Daane’s claim concerning the silence
of Reformed pulpits on the theme of election. Perhaps what Daane writes on this
score is true of his own denomination and of others; by experience,
this reviewer can say without qualification that Protestant Reformed pulpits
are not silent on this theme. We differ with Daane also as to both reasons
which he adduces for this alleged silence of Reformed pulpits. We differ
especially with his claim that the Reformed truth of election (and it must be kept
in mind that Daane himself recognizes the outstanding Protestant Reformed
theologian as having most consistently developed this truth in the manner of
which Daane is critical)—we differ with the claim that this Reformed doctrine
of election became “increasingly unpreachable.” We differ,
further, with Daane’s claim that all Reformed decretal theologians thought
“that God’s eternal purpose in Christ must be defined within the terms of God's
all-inclusive decree.” Either Daane has never understood the theology of Herman
Hoeksema, or he is guilty of deliberately misrepresenting it. If this reviewer
understands the theology of Herman Hoeksema, he never taught that “what God
eternally purposed in Christ was left to be defined in the larger context of
another more expansive decree.” The contrary is true.
Some of these basic disagreements with
Daane we shall touch upon in the course of this review. And although Daane’s
book is predominantly critical, even in those chapters in which his own view is
supposed to be developed, we also purpose to consider the question whether
Daane’s own view can at all be classified as biblical, Reformed, and
preachable.
*
* * * * *
*
After
a brief chapter on “The Sum and Substance of the Gospel” Daane turns immediately to his criticism of
the Reformed doctrine of election, which he characterizes as “decretal
theology” and “Protestant
scholasticism.” As we said, the
largest part of Daane’s book is devoted to a criticism and a polemic against
this “decretal theology.” Even in the chapters in which Daane is supposed to
develop his own view, he finds it difficult to stick to his subject, and he
wanders off repeatedly into renewed criticism of the Reformed doctrine of
election.
Now
it is of the utmost importance that when one criticizes a view, and especially
when one criticizes a view of so important a doctrine as the doctrine of
election, and more especially when one criticizes a view which he himself
admits to be the traditional view, that is, the view held over a long period of
time and by the majority of Reformed theologians, then he must be accurate, fair,
and honest in his presentation of the view which he criticizes. For one thing,
he must not present a caricature of that view, but the view itself. For
another, he ought to be careful to allow the representatives of that view to
speak for themselves, and not to present his characterization or his slanted
and prejudiced presentation of the views
of those representatives. This also implies, of course, that when he
quotes others, he should quote them accurately and fully. Still more, when such
a critic attempts to portray that which is traditional, that which belongs to
the main line of history, that which is a trend, he should be careful to choose
and to call attention to that which is genuinely representative, and
not merely to some aberrations. If in his critique and his polemic an author
fails in these respects, his critique becomes suspect, his reliability is
impeached, and his polemic, of course,
becomes valueless, due to the
fact that it is a polemic against a straw man.
Now
it is the claim of this reviewer that Daane’s book falls short precisely in the
above-mentioned respects. And of this we can produce clear evidence.
Dr.
Daane considers the late Herman Hoeksema to be the most consistent
representative of “decretal theology.” In
his criticism of twentieth century representatives of “decretal theology” Daane
refers
to Hoeksema more often than to any other theologian. It is but natural that our
interest in this connection is chiefly in Daane’s presentation and criticism of
Hoeksema’s theology with respect to election and reprobation. And it is with
this theology that we are best acquainted, and therefore also in a position to judge
whether Daane presents this theology accurately, fairly, and honestly.
And it is our judgment that if the
manner in which Dr. Daane presents the theology of Herman Hoeksema is a sample,
then Daane is not to be trusted when he presents the theology of any so-called decretal
theologian in his book, whether that be Van Til, Berkhof, Turretin, Beza, or
Calvin himself. This reviewer, for one, cannot recognize the theology of Herman
Hoeksema and of the Protestant Reformed churches in the picture which Daane
draws both by quotation and by direct reference. And although this may seem a
heavy charge, we find it difficult to believe that the misrepresentations made by
Dr. Daane are mere mistakes and misunderstandings. The misrepresentations are
too obvious and Hoeksema’s writings are too plain for this to be believed.
Let us check on this.
On page 26 Daane writes as follows:
Again,
Hoeksema contends that when God speaks to man, he speaks not so much to man as
to himself. God’s word spoken in Christ is less spoken to man than to himself. (Here
there is a footnote referring to Hoeksema’s Reformed
Dogmatics, pp. 16-17. HCH) If God spoke to man redemptively in Jesus
Christ, God would be responding to a condition lying outside of himself.
Finally, Hoeksema contends that when God loves man, his love is not at bottom a
response to the reality of man but to himself, for in loving man God loves only
his own image in man, and thus his love for man is primarily an act self-love.
At the end of the above quotation there
is another footnote, which reads as follows:
If
any divine responsive action is seen
as a conditional action, and if it is rejected on that account, what meaning is
left to God’s judgment on sin and His wrath against the sinner? Hoeksema
replies by eternalizing the wrath of God. In order to do that, divine wrath must be seen as
internalized within God, with the result that it is seen as an attribute of
God, apart from any external object of
wrath. Such a God is in himself a
God of wrath. What is rejected here is far more than the conditionality found
in Arminianism. Conditionality as defined and rejected by decretal theology is
an overkill of Arminian theology, an overkill that exacts its price within
decretal theology. Cf. Hoeksema, Reformed
Dogmatics, pp. 104-123.
In the above quotation and the two
footnotes there are no less than three misrepresentations of Hoeksema’s
position. The first reference is to Hoeksema’s “Introduction to Dogmatics,” where
he is speaking of the principles of the knowledge of God. But if one consults
Hoeksema’s own language on the pages referred to, he cannot find any such
statement as Daane attributes to Hoeksema. With not a word does Hoeksema say
that “God speaks not so much to man as to Himself.” With not a word does
Hoeksema say, “God’s word spoken in Christ is less spoken to man than to
himself.” Hoeksema does indeed emphasize that “we must remember that also in
this Word of God ad extra He does not
speak in the first place to us, but of Himself and to Himself.” But this is by
no means the same as Daane’s statement concerning Hoeksema’s contention in this
section. This is the first misrepresentation. The second is Daane’s next
sentence: “If God spoke to man redemptively in Jesus Christ, God would be
responding to a condition lying outside of himself.” Daane leaves the impression
as though this is Hoeksema’s teaching, and therefore as though Hoeksema does
not and cannot teach that God “spoke to man redemptively in Jesus Christ.” Nothing
could be farther from the truth. Here is the second misrepresentation. But the
most serious misrepresentation is that found in the footnote concerning the
wrath of God. Here Daane fails to quote Hoeksema at all. One would certainly
expect that for such an important point Daane would furnish proof in the form of
a direct quotation. But of all that Daane writes in this footnote, and
especially of the idea that Hoeksema internalizes
God’s wrath, and above all of the idea that Hoeksema presents God’s wrath as an
attribute of God,—of all this Daane
offers absolutely no proof. Meanwhile, by his reference to pp. 104-123 of Reformed Dogmatics he leaves the
impression that this is indeed Hoeksema’s theology. And, of course, the very
suggestion that wrath is an attribute
of God, or that God is in Himself a
God of wrath is abhorrent on the surface of it. Yet, the alert reader, who
checks up on the page references given by Daane will discover that Hoeksema
suggests this with not so much as a word, and that by no stretch of the
imagination could this even be distilled from what Hoeksema writes in these
pages concerning some of God’s attributes. This is reprehensible
misrepresentation.
Another
example. On page 27 Daane writes as follows:
When the Protestant Reformed Churches
divided into two denominations in 1957, the issue that produced the split was a
crisis of the pulpit. Separation occurred over the legitimacy of saying in the
pulpit, “If you believe, God will save you.” Hoeksema rejected this formulation because of its
conditionality. He saw it as a concession to Arminianism and a surrender to
conditionality of God’s true sovereignty. Given his position, the crisis would
have been theologically the same if the issue had been stated in reverse: “If
you do not believe, God will damn you.” Either expression was
heretical because it endorsed the kind of conditionality Hoeksema rejected.
In
this one short paragraph there are at least four mistakes or
misrepresentations, anyone of which might easily have been avoided. In the
first place, it is an error of fact when Daane states that the split in the
Protestant Reformed Churches occurred in 1957. It was not 1957, hut 1953. This
is in itself a minor item; nevertheless it is an indication of Daane’s
carelessness with the facts, an indication of failure to do simple historical research.
I dare say that if Daane had only checked up on some of his own journalistic
writings of that time, he might have discovered this error. In the second
place, it is simply not true that “the issue that produced the split was a
crisis of the pulpit.” Daane is here bending the facts to fit his proposition
in this chapter that under “decretal theology” there is a gap between election and preaching. It is true, indeed, that the heresy
which was condemned by the Protestant Reformed Churches in 1953 was
a heresy that was spoken in the pulpit.
It is not true, however, that the separation occurred over the legitimacy as such of saying or not saying something in the pulpit. This is only Daane’s unproved claim,
made again in his desperate effort to show that “decretal theology” has
no gospel to preach. In the third
place, Daane does not quote the statement in question in that controversy, but
something entirely different. Daane makes the statement this: “If you believe,
God will save you.” The statement which was condemned by the Protestant
Reformed Churches in 1953 was considerably different. Condemned as literally
heretical was a statement which embodied the heresy of a general, conditional
promise: “God promises everyone of you that, if you believe, you will be saved.” And
that there is considerable difference between the two should be plain from the
fact that in the course of the controversy it was stated more than once that if
a minister said in the pulpit, “I proclaim to all of you that if you believe,
you will be saved,” this would be perfectly legitimate. Now it is not my
purpose at this stage to enter into the difference between the statement which was
made and the statement which Daane presents as the quotation on page 27. I only
want to point out the misrepresentation. Dr. Daane cannot show with a single
fact that Hoeksema ever said in 1953 that the statement which he has placed in
quotation marks was seen as “a concession to Arminianism and a surrender
to conditionality of God’s true sovereignty.” And this would not be so serious,
were it not for the fact that Daane gave considerable attention to the
controversy mentioned at the time that it occurred. Charitably stated,
therefore, we may say that Dr. Daane failed to do his research although he had
sufficient access to Protestant Reformed literature to be able to do this
research rather easily. Charitably stated,
we
may say that Daane is careless here about his facts, that he is talking “off
the top of his head.” But even this is both dangerous and
unfair when one is making charges as serious as those which Daane here makes.
And as a result of the inaccuracy just mentioned Daane makes himself guilty of
a fourth one when he draws the conclusion: “Given his position, the crisis
would have been theologically the same if the issue had been stated in reverse:
‘If you do not believe, God will damn you.’
Either expression was heretical because it endorsed the kind of conditionality
Hoeksema rejected.” From no writings of Herman Hoeksema or of anyone else in
the Protestant Reformed Churches can Daane show, directly or by implication,
that the statement, “If you do not believe, God will damn you,” is considered
heretical.
In
all this. Dr. Daane is guilty of bending the
facts order to support his own
false proposition of a gap between election and preaching. If Daane would make charges
of this kind, let him come with objective evidence. It will not do facilely to
avoid saying that the gospel is not heard in the Protestant Reformed Churches,
the churches that follow Hoeksema’s theology,
by saying as Daane does that “The
gospel is able to break through our theological mutations of it and gain a
hearing for itself.” This is only an easy way of avoiding the
conclusion which Daane for some reason does not want to draw, namely, that the
gospel is not heard in churches that follow this “decretal theology.” Nor will
it do to say as Daane does, and that without an iota of proof, that “Such a
gospel can be announced—cooly, objectively, without pathos or human concern or
tears—but it cannot be preached with persuasion, with the tears of Jesus and
the anguish of Paul for his unbelieving fellow Jews” (p. 27). If
Daane had only taken the trouble to consult some examples of Hoeksema’s
preaching on Romans 9-11, he would have discovered that the contrary is true.
And shall I remind him that there was a time when he listened to that preaching
rather often? Even if he cannot recall that, he could consult Hoeksema’s
writings.
Here
is a third example. In his chapter on “The Single Decree,” Daane writes as
follows on pp. 60, 61:
What decretal theologians mean by divine
sovereignty derives much of its connotation from this view of the decree.
Decretal theologians, of course, do speak of God’s sovereign freedom.
Discussing God’s speech to what is outside of himself, Hoeksema says, “It should
be emphasized that this is not an act of necessity but of sovereignty, of
sovereign freedom”—but then he continues: “determined by His sovereign, eternal
counsel.” (The reference is again to Reformed
Dogmatics, pp. 16, 17. HCH) But what is a “sovereign freedom” that is determined by a “sovereign
counsel”? It is no freedom at all. God’s freedom is not
determined by his counsel; his counsel is an expression of his freedom. Only on
this understanding can we assert that God created and redeemed the world, not
out of necessity, but in freedom, and that grace is an expression of God’s
freedom, not a necessary reflex according to which he is merciful to himself.
Now
I ask in all seriousness: does Daane consider Hoeksema to have been such a
theological ignoramus as to teach what Daane here claims that
Hoeksema teaches? It is, of course, nonsense, complete and utter nonsense, to
say that God’s “sovereign freedom” is “determined by his sovereign, eternal counsel.” It
is perfectly obvious that a determined
freedom cannot be a sovereign
freedom. And it is certainly true, as Daane states, that God’s counsel is an
expression of God’s freedom. But this is exactly Hoeksema’s position in the
quotation given. And in the light of the fact that the quotation as interpreted by Daane is nonsensical, it
should have been plain to Dr. Daane that this was not Hoeksema’s meaning at
all. His meaning in this brief quotation is that the phrase “determined by His
sovereign, eternal counsel” is an appositive to the phrase “of sovereign
freedom” and to the phrase “of sovereignty.” God’s speaking His Word ad extra is an act of sovereignty, that
is, an act of sovereign freedom, that is, an act determined by His sovereign,
eternal counsel. And that this is the only possible interpretation of this
statement of Hoeksema is plain from the negative part of his proposition here,
namely, that God’s speech ad extra “is
not an act of necessity.” I ask, is this carelessness on
Daane’s part? Is it ignorance? Or is it deliberate misrepresentation? Daane may
choose.
Another example of such
misrepresentation of Hoeksema’s theology may be found on page 36. In the
context Daane is speaking of the expression in the Conclusion of the Canons, “in the same manner.” To
this subject we shall return presently. In this connection Daane speaks of his
claim that in traditional Reformed theology “the Canons’ imbalance between
election and reprobation was thus often lost (when Reformed theology gave election
and reprobation equal footing, HCH); the logic
of reprobation, as we shall see later, triumphed
over election.” And then Daane goes on to say: “When this happened a demonic element was introduced into some
Reformed theologies, as is inevitable when the relation between election and
reprobation is taken to be one of mutuality, for such mutuality tears the
gospel apart.” It is at this point that Daane again refers to Hoeksema’s
theology, as follows:
An
example of this emergence of the demonic can be seen in Hoeksema’s theology.
According to Hoeksema, God decreed to reveal in Christ his own covenantal life.
Everything else in God’s all-comprehensive
decree is a means to that end. Since Christ and the community of the elect
reflect God’s inner covenantal life, election at this point in his thought has
a priority. Within the pattern of the decree, reprobation also serves the
purpose of election, “as the chaff serves the ripening of the wheat.” Here
again election has the priority. But Hoeksema further holds that God had to
reject some if he was to elect some. Reprobation was absolutely necessary for
the election. “Rejection exists to realize election: rejection was necessary to
bring the elect to the glory which God had ordained for them in His infinite love.” (The brief quotations are from Reformed Dogmatics, p. 165, and De
Plaats der Verwerping in de Verkondiging des Evangelies [1917], p. 16. HCH)
Now if God must damn some in order to elect
and bless others, he is not sovereignly free in his grace. But this means that
reprobation has really triumphed over election, for reprobation and human
damnation are required for a disclosure of the nature of God’s covenantal life.
God was obliged to reprobate. He could not do otherwise. How forthrightly, and
with what confidence, decretal theologians delimit the possibilities of the
sovereign God! G. C. Berkouwer finds this “frightening and alarming” [Divine Election, p. 207n.]. It is a
clear instance of how scholastic decretal theologians must read alien elements
into God.
Now
if I may use a term which Daane himself applies to Hoeksema’s theology, here we
see the emergence of “the demonic” in Daane’s treatment of “decretal theology.”
For, in the first place, if there is any Reformed theologian who does not
balance election and reprobation, it is Hoeksema. In fact, this is the very
point in the brief quotations which Daane makes in this connection from
Hoeksema. Yet, in the context Daane is speaking of an alleged imbalance in the Canons between election and reprobation
and an alleged tendency to give election and reprobation equal footing on the part of decretal theologians. But at no point in his
theology, and especially in his exposition of election and reprobation, does
Hoeksema give election and reprobation equal footing. In the second place, if
Daane has ever read Hoeksema’s theology, he knows very well—and
could learn from both sources from which he quotes—that Hoeksema at no point in
his theology posits a necessity of reprobation which is of the nature of an
absolute necessity for God, so that God’s sovereign freedom, either in election or reprobation, is denied. And I ask: what
nonsense is it to claim that in Hoeksema’s theology reprobation has triumphed over election, when at every point in his theology Hoeksema
makes reprobation subordinate to election? The difficulty is, of course, that
Daane is here aping G. C. Berkouwer who himself obtained his quotation of
Hoeksema at this point second hand. Later, on pages 137 and 138, Daane
claims that he has shown that Hoeksema “made reprobation the precondition of
election,” something to which, of course, Hoeksema never subscribed.
We
could go on and analyze every reference of Daane in this book to the theology
of Herman Hoeksema. We would discover that at no point does Daane present this
theology sympathetically. But worse, we would discover that at no point does
Daane present Hoeksema’s theology honestly and fairly. He puts words in
Hoeksema’s mouth, words to which Hoeksema would never have subscribed. And he
does this in order to drive Hoeksema and “decretal theologians” into
a corner in which they do not want to stand and in which they never did stand.
In other words, when Daane has finished describing decretal theology at various
points in his book, the result is not an accurate picture of the position of
genuine decretal theology, but a caricature. And this means that in his book
Daane does not fight decretal theology, but a straw man.
These
few examples of the manner in which Daane misrepresents Hoeksema’s theology
should caution the reader against accepting uncritically Daane’s presentation
of other theologians, Daane’s presentation of the Canons of Dordrecht, and Daane’s presentation of the history of
Reformed preaching or of Reformed inability to preach election. At no point in his
presentation of Church History in connection with this subject and at no point in
his presentation of the views of others, from Calvin to the present, is Daane
to be accepted uncritically. John Calvin himself is about the only Reformed
theologian whom Daane does not criticize. And yet the very fact that Daane does
not correctly present Calvin probably also accounts in part for the fact that Daane
does not criticize him.
Now
admittedly all of the preceding has more to do with the method of Daane than with the content of
his book, even the negative content. This we freely admit. This, however, we
insist is important. Daane claims to present in his book something new and better
in comparison with decretal theology. In order to do so, he must first show
that decretal theology is defective, and that therefore it must be replaced.
But in order to show that it is defective, he must picture true decretal
theology, and not rear up a straw man to shoot down. And in order to picture
true decretal theology, he must present the teachings of decretal theologians
as fairly, as completely, and as sympathetically as possible. In this Daane
fails utterly. He himself classes Hoeksema as the most consistent of the
decretal theologians. But if his presentation of Hoeksema is a sample of his
presentation of Van Til, Berkhof, Turretin, Beza, and Calvin, then this
reviewer would advise the reader to go back to the sources rather than trust Daane.
*
* * *
* * *
This
brings us to another phase of our criticism. Daane’s book is supposed to be in
the nature of a solution to a problem. The problem, according to Daane is that
election is not preached. The reason for the problem, according to Daane, is
that Reformed theologians have an incorrect view of election. And the alleged solution
to the problem is Daane’s better view of election.
It
is but natural that the book, therefore, should begin with the presentation of
the problem. This is what Daane does in his chapter on “The Gap Between
Election and Preaching.”
But
the difficulty is that the statement of the problem is faulty. And if the
statement of the problem is faulty, the solution will also necessarily be
faulty.
How
does Daane present the problem?
In
his chapter on “The Gap Between Election and Preaching” Daane first gives his
attention briefly to Arminian theology, in order to show that “the Arminian
doctrine of election is not preachable.” I
cannot refrain from suggesting that it was at this point in his book that Daane
should have seen the obvious solution to the absence of election-preaching from
so many Reformed pulpits. That solution, in the view of this
reviewer, lies in the surrender of Reformed churches and Reformed pulpits to
Arminian heresy. In his desperate effort to get election back into the pulpit (not
into Protestant Reformed pulpits, from which it has never been absent, but into
other Reformed pulpits) Daane arrives principally at the same position as that
of Arminianism. That is, he denies sovereign reprobation. Thereby he adopts
principally the position of Arminianism. But he himself states—and correctly so—that
the Arminian doctrine of election is not preachable.
And thus it takes Daane some 200 pages to reach a solution which is not a
solution, while the obvious solution (forsake Arminianism and get back to the
Reformed position on predestination) is ignored.
But let us note how Daane presents the
problem of this alleged gap between election and preaching in Reformed pulpits.
He writes on page 19:
But
the gap between the Reformed doctrine of election and the Reformed pulpit is
much more serious. Not only is election scarcely whispered in most Reformed pulpits,
but the Reformed doctrine of election has at times imperiled the very
possibility of preaching the gospel. If Arminianism (which is shorthand for a peculiar
definition of election) was unable to include election within its preaching of the gospel, Reformed theology (which is
shorthand for another definition of election) was at some points in its history
theoretically unable, because of its view of election, to preach the gospel at
all. To this history we shall now turn.
In
classical Reformed theology, election does not stand alone. Although Scripture
speaks of predestination to life and never, explicitly, of predestination to damnation, election in Reformed
thought implies its opposite, reprobation. Election was regarded as selection,
a divine choice by which some men were predestined to eternal life, and all
other men were regarded as reprobates predestined to eternal damnation. With
election, reprobation emerges. This dual aspect was frequently called “double
predestination.”
The
combination of election and reprobation created considerable intellectual difficulties
for theologians, as the long history of Christian thought reveals. But for
those called to preach the gospel, it created an even greater problem. How
could one preach election?
The difficulty here stems not from
election, but from reprobation. If all men were elect, the preaching of election
would create no problems. One could preach election as he preaches all other
Christian truth: by proclaiming it and calling people to believe it. But since
some men are reprobates, the elect are not known. And if they cannot be
identified from the vantage point of the preacher of the gospel, how can
election be preached, even to the elect?
This is the apparent peculiarity of the
doctrine of election. Every other Christian doctrine is susceptible to proclamation.
None contains an inherent difficulty for the preacher. All can be projected in preaching;
all can be proffered as truth that men ought to believe. But it is not so with
the doctrine of election. It is true only of the elect, and there is nothing in
the act of preaching that makes them identifiable. This is not to say that God’s
elect people cannot be known. It is only to say—and for the pulpit this is much—that
there is nothing in the act of preaching that
makes the elect identifiable to the preacher. Election indeed lends itself to lectures
and theological reflection, but it appears impossible to preach—except to those
identified as elect by some method that preaching itself does not possess.
Daane
goes on to claim that reprobation is something that cannot be preached at all,
because it does not meet the criterion of being “something in which men are
summoned to believe and trust to the saving of their souls.” From all of this
it is already apparent that the Reformed doctrine of reprobation is going to be
the scapegoat on which all the alleged sins of Reformed theology and the
Reformed pulpit are heaped, and which is then going to be sent outside the
camp. But this is not the point here. The section just quoted rather concisely
states Daane’s presentation of the problem of election-preaching for
the Reformed pulpit.
But
this presentation of the problem is entirely faulty and wholly imaginary. It is
an unproved claim. Daane claims that since some men are reprobates, the elect
are not known. Although this is a strange piece of reasoning, we will let the
main proposition stand: the elect are not known. But the next proposition, stated
emphatically in the form of a question, is the key proposition
here: “And if they cannot be identified from the vantage point of the preacher
of the gospel, how can election be preached, even to the elect?” Now
here is a plain case of begging the question. The presupposition of Daane at
this point is that in order for election to be preached, the elect must be able
to be identified from the vantage point of the preacher of the gospel. Now
unless Daane means something entirely different from what he appears to say
here, this is abject nonsense. Not only that, but it is a charge which in one
form or another has been made by Arminian enemies against Reformed preachers of
predestination many times. But why is it necessary for the preacher to be able
to identify the elect in order to preach election? This Daane fails to make
plain, and this he does not prove. What is indeed necessary is not that the preacher must be able to identify the
elect, but that the elect must be able to identify themselves in the light of the preaching. Or rather, what is indeed
necessary is that the preaching, in its content, should clearly identify the elect,
so that the elect may be able to find themselves, so to speak, in the gospel
preached. But this is precisely what is done by the general, or promiscuous,
preaching of a particular gospel. That promiscuously preached, particular
gospel identifies, marks, points out the elect according to their spiritual names
and according to their historical manifestation. And so they recognize
themselves and know themselves in the light of the preaching and receive the
personal assurance of their election in Christ. But the problem which Daane
here poses, or rather, the necessity which Daane here imposes upon the
preaching of election is a figment of the imagination and an assumption which he
can show neither from Scripture, nor from Reformed theology, nor from history.
It is small wonder that when Daane
makes such a faulty presentation of the problem, he also arrives at the
solution, and does so by destroying the problem, namely, by getting rid of sovereign
reprobation.
Daane then goes on to claim that the
Reformed doctrine of election “has at times even imperiled the possibility of
preaching the gospel,” let alone that it muted “its own sound
in the pulpit.” In this connection he makes reference to Scottish theologians of the seventeenth century and to Dutch
theologians in the Reformed churches during the eighteenth century. On pages 22
and 23 he writes as follows:
During the eighteenth century the same
problem arose in the Reformed churches in the Netherlands. Election again
challenged the addressability of the gospel to all men. One side in this Dutch
controversy contended that the gospel of the good news of salvation could be preached
only to men whose lives gave evidence of an operation of divine grace. Only
these could safely be regarded as numbered
among the elect, and the good
news of salvation was for the elect only. Thus identification of the elect
became an indispensable condition for proper proclamation of the gospel. A
person’s election had to be established to
the satisfaction of the judgment of others, and established apart from the gospel before his
eligibility to hear the good news could be determined. Until the trustees of
the gospel were satisfied that he was elect, it was not permissible for them to
proclaim and for him to hear and believe that the gospel was good news for him.
Curiously, this identification of a hearer as elect before he heard the
gospel and without aid from it was not regarded as something forbidden by the
warning against “vainly attempting to investigate the secret ways of the Most
High” (Canons of Dort, I, 14).
On the other side of the controversy were
those who recognized this position as theologically absurd and religiously impossible.
They contended that the nature of the gospel is such that it can and must be
preached as the good news of salvation to all men. It is interesting—and theologically
significant—that the theologians on this side of the controversy were dubbed “new lights,” that is, liberal theologians bringing a new, strange light to
fall upon the relation of election and preaching. And the theologians who
opposed these “new lights” and muted preaching in the name of election by making identification of the elect an
indispensable condition for the addressability of the gospel were designated as
“old lights,” that is, conservative theologians faithful and loyal to the
Reformed tradition.
Now
it is worthy of careful attention that throughout this little excursion into
what might be called a history of preaching in Reformed churches there is
absolutely no mention of the names of theologians or preachers, nor any mention
of specific churches, nor any reference to sources of information. Hence, it is
impossible to check the accuracy of what Daane here relates; and it is
impossible to determine from the information given by Daane whether or not he is
speaking of theologians and preachers who had a place in the mainstream of
Reformed theology and the Reformed churches, or whether he is writing here of
off-shoots and aberrations. This reviewer does not believe, and will not believe
unless definite proof is furnished, that the picture drawn by Daane of this
kind of gap between election and preaching is a picture of a phenomenon in the
mainstream of Reformed theology and in the main current of the preaching of
Reformed churches. That there have been and still are Hyper-Calvinists similar
to those described (though not named Hyper-Calvinists by Daane) is undoubtedly
a fact. But that they do not stand in the mainstream of Reformed theology and
preaching is also a fact. And that the problem represented in the controversy raised
by their kind of preaching is not a problem which inheres in so-called decretal
theology as such is also a fact.
But all this is again illustrative of
the extremes to which James Daane will go in his unjustified and unsuccessful
attempt to place so-called decretal theology in a bad light, in order
presumably to make room for his own proposed solution of a problem which after
all is the figment of his own imagination. We repeat that we do not deny that
the truth of election (and reprobation) has been muted in many Reformed
pulpits. Dr. Daane could have discovered that the history of these churches
shows (and this includes his own Christian Reformed denomination) that the
point at which election began no longer to be heard from the pulpit was that point
in history when Reformed churches began to compromise and to depart from
decretal theology. If Daane’s study of the gap between election and preaching
had concentrated on this facet, it would have been far more profitable, and it
might have resulted in a better solution being presented in this book.
*
* * *
* * *
The next question we consider is this: what is Daane’s attitude toward the Canons of Dordrecht? There are
especially two passages in this book in which Daane speaks rather at length
concerning the teaching of the Canons.
We refer, first of all, to Daane’s attempt to explain Canons I, 6,
particularly the well-known statement, “That some receive the gift of faith and
others do not receive it, proceeds from God’s eternal decree.” Daane is here faced by the fact that the Canons here explicitly teach a single decree
of election and reprobation, a doctrine which Daane abhors. He tries
desperately to explain away the plain teachings of the Canons at this point by claiming that what the Canons say may not be interpreted in terms of “the single decree of
a later decretal
theology.” He claims that the
single decree of the Canons is not the
same as the single decree of later Reformed theology. And thus he makes room
for himself to be in somewhat grudging agreement with Canons I, 6. Possibly thinking that the best defense is a good offense,
he even tries to put the onus of being in disagreement with the Canons at this point on “latter-day
decretal theologians,” who “read (the Canons)
in terms of a post-Dort scholasticism.” As might be expected, Daane, as he has
frequently done in the past, and following Berkouwer, appeals to the “in
eodem modo” which occurs in the
Conclusion of the Canons. We have
been over this subject before, as Daane also knows. And we shall not repeat in detail
what we have pointed out before. Our criticisms are twofold: 1) The method of
interpreting the Canons themselves in
the light of a statement in the Conclusion is utterly faulty. The proper method
would be to interpret the statement in the Conclusion in the light of the body of
the Canons. Daane’s method is
tantamount to letting the tail wag the dog. 2) At this point and throughout the
book Daane ranges far afield from the actual statement
in the Conclusion of the Canons.
Repeatedly in his book Daane writes as though the Canons simply reject in
general the teaching that God elects and reprobates in the same manner. But
this is by no means the position taken in the Conclusion. The statement made there
is much more careful and much more specific. He must remember that in this
section of the Conclusion there is a quotation of a whole series of false and
slanderous charges made by the enemy against the doctrine of the Reformed
churches concerning predestination. The Synod of Dordrecht in effect not only
casts these charges far away and detests them, but also points out that those who
make these charges “have violated all truth, equity, and charity, in
wishing to persuade the public” against the doctrine of the Reformed churches.
Now what specifically was that false charge in which the phrase “in the same manner” appears? Has it merely the general
statement, without any limitation, that God elects and reprobates in the same
manner? By no means! Here is the statement: “That in the same manner in which
the election is the fountain and the cause of faith and good works, reprobation is the
cause of unbelief and impiety.” Operating on the principle that the fountain and
that which flows from the fountain are morally identified, and proceeding from
the fact that the fathers call election not only the cause, but the fountain and cause of faith and good
works, and proceeding from the fact that the fathers teach a sovereign reprobation, the enemy
slandered the Reformed fathers by saying that they taught that reprobation is
the fountain of unbelief and impiety, even as election is the cause in the
sense that it is the fountain of faith and good works. In other words, the
enemy was bringing the old slander that the Reformed doctrine of reprobation
makes God an evil God, the author of sin. For the fountain and that which flows
from the fountain are morally identified. If what flows from the fountain is
evil and corrupt, then the fountain is evil and corrupt. The only thing,
therefore, which the fathers cast far from them in the Conclusion is the same
thing which they cast far from them in Canons
I, 15, namely, the idea that God could possibly be the author of sin. But it is
important to note that this kind
of charge would not even be brought against the kind of reprobation which Daane
wants to teach. It would only be brought against the kind of reprobation taught
by the Canons and by decretal
theologians, namely, a sovereign reprobation, that is, a
reprobation according to which God is indeed the sovereign cause of unbelief
and impiety without being the author of sin. This interpretation will
stand the test of the Canons
themselves. It will stand the test of the record of the Synod of Dordt, in
which the opinions of the delegates appear in detail. And it is high time that
Daane stops making this illegitimate use of an inaccurately cited phrase in
order to corrupt the teachings of the Canons.
There is a further inaccuracy in what Daane states in this connection. On page
41 he writes: “The Canons explicitly reject the idea that God is in any sense
the cause of sin and unbelief.” This Daane cannot possibly show. What the Canons explicitly reject is the idea that the cause of sin and unbelief
in the sense of guilt, or blame, is in any wise in God. This is the teaching of Canons I, 5.
However,
when Daane returns to this subject of the Canons
in his next chapter, he faces again the fact that the Canons explicitly teach a single decree of election and
reprobation. And while on pages 40 and 41 he seems to try to justify the Canons and to find a home for himself
under the Canons, on page 46 it would
appear that his wrath against the doctrine of a single decree cannot be restrained
even when it comes to the Canons. For
while he must concede that the Canons
very pointedly teach that there is a single decree of God, he writes:
Whether it is possible to hold to a single
decree that includes both election and reprobation and to hold at the same time
that God does not elect and reprobate “in
the same manner” is a rhetorical question. If God elects in one manner and
rejects in another, then it is impossible to attach any actual meaning to the
singularity of the divine decree. It seems clear that the rejection of the “in
the same manner” introduces a distinction into the concept of singularity that
makes the quality of singularity highly problematic. So while the insistence on
a single as opposed to a multiple decree was useful in debate with the
Arminians, it also undermines the Canons’ rejection
of the “in the same manner.”
There
are other points in the book at which Daane’s hostility against the Canons shows only too clearly. For
example, Daane does not like the fact that the Canons speak of the “number of the elect” (p. 137). And he does not like the fact
that the Canons teach limited
atonement, although he claims that they do not teach limited atonement, and
certainly overlooks the Rejection of Errors when he mistakenly claims that the Canons “cite no Scripture passages to
prove ‘limited atonement.’”
But
the deepest disagreement of Dr. Daane with the Canons is on the score of the doctrine of reprobation. This lies at
the root of everything. In fact it is this denial of sovereign reprobation which
is in a sense the key to all that Daane writes in this book.
*
* * *
* * *
As
far as the positive section of this book is concerned, we may be very brief. In
the main, although even in this positive section Daane cannot refrain from inveighing
against decretal theology, this positive section consists of a chapter on “The Election
of Israel,” “The Election of Jesus Christ,” “The Election of the Church,” “The
Freedom of God and the Logic of Election,”
“Election and Preaching.” Concerning
this section of the book we state the following:
1. After all Daane’s criticism of
Reformed theology that has held the field for centuries, one would expect that
in the positive part of his book he would develop a careful and thoroughgoing
view to replace what he so sharply criticizes and rejects. Instead, he produces
something very scant and very vague.
2. Before Daane expects anyone to
believe what he writes concerning the election of Israel (a national election)
he ought at least to favor his readers with a thoroughgoing and pertinent
explanation of Romans 9-11, rather than give this classic passage (and in fact,
the whole subject) the once-over-lightly.
3. Specifically, in his treatment of the election of
Israel, Daane fails to reckon with the fact that election and reprobation cut right
across the generations of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. He fails, too, to reckon
with the fact that from the outset the reference in Romans 9 is to the election
and rejection of individuals, of persons. If Daane would address himself
directly to the exposition of the text in this classic passage, he would be compelled
to give up his notion of a national election of Israel. He would also be compelled
to give up his denial of reprobation, which begins to put in its appearance
very plainly in this chapter, as, for example, in the following statements: “The
unique and peculiar election of Jesus Christ itself excluded no man or family
or tribe or nation in the world. It only excluded that sinful pride by which a man or family or tribe or nation would make
itself the Elect
of God, the man (or family, tribe, or
nation) of destiny, the one through which God would deal with all other men.” (pp.
107, 108)
4. Undoubtedly, from a formal point of
view, Daane hits upon a key idea when he speaks of the election of Jesus
Christ. But the correctness of Daane’s emphasis on Christ’s election is only formal.
Daane completely spoils this emphasis by pouring into this idea of the election
of Jesus Christ a content foreign to Reformed theology, and one, we may add, with strong overtones of
Barthianism. If Daane would pay as much attention to Herman Hoeksema’s emphasis
on the election of Christ (as, for example in his Christology and in his
Exposition of Colossians 1:14 ff.) as he does to Herman Hoeksema’s allegedly
faulty decretal theology, he might have learned something; and he certainly
would have kept many untrue characterizations of Hoeksema’s decretal theology
in his pen.
5.
When Daane finally gets around to the subject of election and preaching, he
gets rid of the problem of which his book was supposed to present the solution
by an explicit denial of all that has ever been considered Reformed with
respect to the doctrine of reprobation (p. 200): “for Christ is the truth of
election, the reason that some men are saved, but not the reason that some are not. This means that any doctrine
of reprobation is illegitimate by biblical standards except that which biblical teaching sanctions: that he who rejects
God, God rejects.” Herewith, whether he will admit it or not, Daane has also
lost the Reformed doctrine of election—if, in fact, he had anything left of it
after his strange and speculative description of a historical decree.
Finally,
after having poured into election and reprobation, into sovereignty and
eternity, as well as into the election of Christ, a content foreign to the
Reformed faith and to the Scriptures,
Daane
gets around to answering the question whether individual, or personal, election
can be preached, by, in effect, saying,
“Yes, by preaching Christ.” Really now, does it require more than 200
pages of turning all of Reformed theology upside down and of pouring strange
contents into biblical and Reformed terms, in order to arrive at the simple
conclusion that the assurance of election can only be found in Jesus Christ?
Personally,
I prefer the Reformed, scriptural, clear, and far more explicit answer of our Canons of Dordrecht.
No comments:
Post a Comment