XIV. Although God does not
intend the salvation of the reprobate by calling them, still he acts most
seriously and sincerely; nor can any hypocrisy and deception be charged against
him -- neither with respect to God himself (because he seriously and most truly
shows them the only and most certain way of salvation, seriously exhorts them
to follow it and most sincerely promises salvation to all those who do follow
it [to wit, believers and penitents]; nor does he only promise, but actually
bestows it according to his promise); nor as to men because the offer of
salvation is not made to them absolutely, but under a condition and thus it
posits nothing unless the condition is fulfilled, which is wanting on the part
of man. Hence we cordially embrace what is said on this subject by the fathers
of the Synod of Dort: “As many as are called through the gospel are seriously
called. For God shows seriously and most truly in his word, what is pleasing to
him, to wit, that the called should come to him. He also seriously promises to
all who come to him and believe rest to their souls and eternal life” (“Tertium et Quartum: De Hominis Corruptione
et Conversione," 8 Acta Synodi
Nationalis ... Dordrechti
[1619-20], 1:[302]).
XV. He, who by calling men
shows that he wills their salvation and yet does not will it, acts deceitfully,
if it is understood of the same will (i.e., if he shows that he wills that by
the will of decree and yet does not will it; or by the will of precept and yet
does not will it). But if it refers to diverse wills, the reasoning does not
equally hold good. For example, if he shows that he wills a thing by the will
of precept and yet does not will it by the will of decree, there is no
simulation or hypocrisy here (as in prescribing the law to men, he shows that
he wills they should fulfill it as to approbation and command, but not
immediately as to decree). Now in calling God indeed shows that he wills the
salvation of the called by the will of precept and good pleasure (euarestias), but not by the will of
decree. For calling shows what God wills man should do, but not what he himself
had decreed to do. It teaches what is pleasing and acceptable to God and in
accordance with his own nature (namely, that the called should come to him);
but not what he himself has determined to do concerning man. It signifies what
God is prepared to give believers and penitents, but not what he has actually
decreed to give to this or that person.
XVI. It is one thing to will
reprobates to come (i.e., to command them to come and to desire it); another to
will they should not come (i.e., to nill the giving them the power to come).
God can in calling them will the former and yet not the latter without any
contrariety because the former respects only the will of precept, while the
latter respects the will of decree. Although these are diverse (because they
propose diverse objects to themselves, the former the commanding of duty, but
the latter the execution of the thing itself), still they are not opposite and
contrary, but are in the highest degree consistent with each other in various
respects. He does not seriously call who does not will the called to come
(i.e., who does not command nor is pleased with his coming). But not he who
does not will him to come whither he calls (i.e., did not intend and decree to
come). For a serious call does not require that there should be an intention
and purpose of drawing him, but only that there should be a constant will of
commanding duty and bestowing the blessing upon him who performs it (which God
most seriously wills). But if he seriously makes known what he enjoins upon the
man and what is the way of salvation and what is agreeable to himself, God does
not forthwith make known what he himself intended and decreed to do. Nor, if
among men, a prince or a legislator commands nothing which he does not will
(i.e., does not intend should also be done by his subjects because he has not
the power of effecting this in them), does it follow that such is the case with
God, upon whom alone it depends not only to command but also to effect this in
man. But if such a legislator could be granted among men, he would rightly be
said to will that which he approves and commands, although he does not intend
to effect it.
XXI. The invitation to the
wedding proposed in the parable (Mt. 22:1-14) teaches that the king wills
(i.e., commands and desires) the invited to come and that this is their duty;
but not that the king intends or has decreed that they should really come.
Otherwise he would have given them the ability to come and would have turned
their hearts. Since he did not do this, it is the surest sign that he did not
will they should come in this way. When it is said “all things are ready” (Luke
14:17), it is not straightway intimated an intention of God to give salvation
to them, but only the sufficiency of Christ’s sacrifice. For he was prepared by
God and offered on the cross as a victim of infinite merit to expiate the sins
of men and to acquire salvation for all clothed in the wedding garment and
flying to him (i.e., to the truly believing and repenting) that no place for
doubting about the truth and perfection of his satisfaction might remain.
(Institutes of Elenctic Theology, topic XV, question II, paragraphs
XIV-XVI and XXI)
This
quote which seemingly contradicts the anti-well-meant-offer position is easily
resolved by taking into account how Turretin is using the term “desire.” Consider
the following from Turretin’s Institutes:
XVII. The passages which attribute a desire
or wish to God do not immediately prove any ineffectual will in him, but things
spoken after the manner of men
must be understood in a manner becoming to God, unless we wish to adopt the
deliriums of the Anthromorphites. (Institutes,
3.16.14, 17-18).
Notice
that he says he is using “desire” improperly, after the manner of men. He does
not consider it to be literal; and thus it is not an argument on behalf of the well-meant
offer.
For
example, if an unbeliever came up to me and said “Does God want me to repent?”
I would say, “Yes” because I am speaking after the manner of men and using
want/desire as an anthropopathism. I do not literally mean that God has a
frustrated desire for his salvation if it turns out that he is a reprobate.
In
effect, Turretin’s reference to Dordt in the extract in question, when
considered in the light of what he writes elsewhere, is an argument against the
view that the Canons demand that one
believe in the well-meant offer, because that is not how Turretin understood
them. Besides, we know that the Geneva Theses
(1649), written before Turretin’s Institutes
was published, was against the well-meant offer.
Turretin
is evidently employing wish/desire in the same sense that Scripture is, namely,
anthropopathically. He is emphatic that such language is not meant to be taken
literally, otherwise we would have to agree with those who teach that God has
literal physical, bodily parts.
Also,
note that elsewhere Turretin says “So he is said to will the repentance of
sinners approvingly and preceptively as a thing most pleasing to himself and
expressed in his commands, although with respect to all of them he nills it
decretively and effectively.” That means that God commands them to repent; it
does not indicate a frustrated desire.
No comments:
Post a Comment