Thomas Aquinas and Common Grace

 

Homer C. Hoeksema (1923-1989)

 

[Source: The Standard Bearer, vol. 20, no. 19 (July 1, 1944), and no. 20 (August 1, 1944)]

 

The accusation has often been directed at us Protestant Reformed people that we stand outside of the historical line of the Reformed faith; this is indeed a powerful argument if it can be substantiated.  But if, on the other hand, the exponents of common grace can be shown not only to stand outside of the historically Reformed line, but to stand in a line which has been strongly and bitterly opposed throughout church history by all who stand for the truth, the central truth, of the sovereignty of God, we have indeed a powerful argument.  Our purpose in this essay is to investigate the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas and his followers to determine his views, if any, on the doctrine of common grace, and to criticize those views.  For this purpose, we shall appeal both to Thomas’s works and to commentaries upon his works.

 

The nature of man, as Thomas views it, then, shall be our first object of investigation.  Before proceeding, it might be well to ask what is understood by the nature of any creature or thing.  Then we answer: the nature of anything is its essence, as delineated by the quality or qualities which distinguish it.  And of course, the first clue to the nature of man is found in Genesis 1:26a and 27 by St. Thomas, as well as by us.  Thomas takes the text of the Vulgate which reads: “Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram” and “Et creavit Deus hominem ad imaginem suam: ad imaginem Dei creavit illum.”  This in contrast to the correct version, where we read, “Let us make man in our image, and after our likeness” and, “So God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him …”  This point is held to tenaciously by Thomas in order that he may interpret the text as meaning, “Let us make man in such a way that our image may be in him,” the preposition, ad, pointing to the term of the making (see Qu. 93, Art. 6, Summa Theologica, I).  This interpretation seems to be of import for the whole ethics of Thomas, as will appear shortly.

 

From this point, Thomas proceeds to develop his ethical views, which remain substantially the same throughout all his works, although expounded in different form and not always with equal clarity in his various works.  Incidentally, Thomas is fundamentally Aristotelian in his ethics as well as in his ontology and epistemology.  The image of God in him is distinguished by Thomas as follows:

 

First of all, Aquinas speaks of the natural state.  According to Thomas, this man in puris naturalibus is a complete man.  But he is a man without the dona superaddita—the supernatural gifts, which are often referred to by Thomas as the real image of God.  This man in puris naturalibus is a good man; in fact he is a man of many virtues.  And it is to this state that man reverted when he fell, losing the image of God.  Furthermore, man in this natural state consists of higher and lower states.  Ueberweg, in volume I of his History of Philosophy, outlines this very neatly as follows: the lower state is exhibited in the ethical (practical) virtues, namely, courage, temperance, liberality, high-mindedness, and love of honor, mildness, truthfulness, urbanity, and friendship, and justice.  The higher state of man in pure nature is exhibited in the dianoetic (intellectual) virtues of art and practical wisdom—capable of variation—and science and reason—not changeable by our agency.  These dianoetic virtues man must follow in his pursuit of ultimate happiness; but he is hindered in this pursuit by the ethical virtues, in which he is, in turn, hindered by the flesh.  In all this it must be remembered that the object of all moral action is the attainment of happiness, and that the highest happiness is connected with the highest virtue.

 

In the second place, Aquinas distinguishes the state of grace.  In this state, Adam stood in Paradise.  Into the man in puris naturalibus are infused the three so-called theological virtues of faith, hope, and love.  This infusion is known as the dona superaddita—the supernatural, superadded gift to which the man in puris naturalibus is adaptable.  However, even in this state of grace, man does not attain to ultimate happiness, to pure act, to pure intellection.  This is only reached in the third state, the state of beatitude, where man knows and loves God perfectly.

 

The exposition of this theory may be found briefly in Summa Theologica, I, Qu. 93, Art 4, where we read as follows:

 

Wherefore we see that the image of God is in man in three ways. First, inasmuch as man possesses a natural aptitude for understanding and loving God; and this aptitude consists in the very nature of the mind, which is common to all men. Secondly, inasmuch as man actually and habitually knows and loves God, though imperfectly; and this image consists in the conformity of grace. Thirdly, inasmuch as man knows and loves God perfectly; and this image consists in the likeness of glory … The first is found in all men, the second only in the just, the third only in the blessed.

 

He speaks similarly in Qu. 95, Art 1, Reply to Objection 4, where we read as follows:

 

The Master here speaks according to the opinion of those who held that man was not created in grace, but only in a state of nature. We may also say that, though man was created in grace, yet it was not by virtue of the nature wherein he was created that he could advance by merit, but by virtue of the grace which was added.

 

But one need not quote more.  This scheme is evidently the foundation of Aquinas’s anthropology and permeates all his teachings on man and his relation to God and the universe (see works previous to the Summa, and Qu. 23 of Summa I).

 

Hand in hand with this teaching, moreover, goes the doctrine that God is favorably inclined to all men.  In his discourses on “The Justice and Mercy of God” and on “Predestination,” Thomas brings this out more than once.  In Qu. 21, Art 4, Summa Theologica I, for example, we read:

 

So in every work of God, viewed at its primary source, there appears mercy. In all that follows, the power of mercy remains, and works indeed with even greater force; as the influence of the first cause is more intense than that of second causes. For this reason does God out of abundance of His goodness bestow upon creatures what is due to them more bountifully than is proportionate to their deserts: since less would suffice for preserving the order of justice than what the divine goodness confers; because between creatures and God’s goodness there can be no proportion.

 

Reply to Objection 1:  Certain works are attributed to justice, and certain others to mercy, because in some justice appears more forcibly and in others mercy. Even in the damnation of the reprobate mercy is seen, which, though it does not totally remit, yet somewhat alleviates, in punishing short of what is deserved.

 

Again, in Question 23, Article 3, Reply to Objection 1, Summa Theologica I, we read’

 

God loves all men and all creatures, inasmuch as He wishes them all some good; but He does not wish every good to them all. So far, therefore, as He does not wish this particular good—namely, eternal life—He is said to hate or reprobated them.

 

In support of both the first and second contentions, we read in Article 7 of Question 23, Summa Theol. I:

 

Reply the Objection 3:  The good that is proportionate to the common state of nature is to be found in the majority; and is wanting in the minority. The good that exceeds the common state of nature is to be found in the minority, and is wanting in the majority. Thus it is clear that the majority of men have a sufficient knowledge for the guidance of life; and those who have not this knowledge are said to be half-witted or foolish; but they who attain to a profound knowledge of things intelligible are a very small minority in respect to the rest. Since their eternal happiness, consisting in the vision of God, exceeds the common state of nature, and especially in so far as this is deprived of grace through the corruption of original sin, those who are saved are in the minority. In this especially, however, appears the mercy of God, that He has chosen some for that salvation, from which very many in accordance with the common course and tendency of nature fall short.

 

Taking these two teachings of Aquinas together, for they are indeed closely bound, what proper observations are allowed?

 

First of all, Thomas holds rather firmly, especially in the Summa Theologica, that the man in puris naturalibus can never merit grace.  However, even this proposition is not maintained strictly in his Libri Sententiarum, where he speaks of “preparation for grace.”  The man in puris naturalibus has only an “aptitude” for knowing and loving God, but that aptitude he does most certainly have, according to Thomas.

 

In the second place, it must be noted that the man in puris naturalibus is a good man, even though he lacks grace.  This teaching is very prominent in both his Libri Sententiarum, in the works of his transition period, and in the Summa.  But he does make distinction between natural and super-natural good.  For example, in the Libri Sententiarum, II, D, 28, Thomas answers the triple question, “Whether man can do any good without grace, and whether without grace he can avoid sin and fulfill God’s commandments?”  To the first question he answers, “Man through a free will is able to do both good and evil, not however in a meritorious act without the habitude of grace.”  To the second, namely, “Utrum homo sine gratia possit vitare peccatum,” he answers that man has also after the fall a free choice and pursuit of good and evil, wherein the potentiality of avoiding sin, at least the mortal sins, lies.  To the third question, he answers that the natural man can certainly fulfill the law of God in so far as the “substance of the work is concerned,” although not according to the intention of the Lawgiver.

 

The same contention is made in the Summa Theol., I Que. 23, Art. 1, albeit in a somewhat different form:

 

The end towards which created things are directed by God is twofold; one which exceeds all proportion and faculty of created nature; and this end is life eternal, that consists in seeing God which is above the nature of every creature, as shown above.  The other end, however, is proportionate to created nature, to which end created being can attain according to the power of its nature.

 

In the third place, Thomas appears at times to place the teaching of God’s goodness to all men behind this ability of the natural man to do good.  This is evident when the Roman Catholic philosopher answers the question, “Whether man by himself is able to prepare himself for grace without some grace?”  (see Libri Sententiarum).  It is further evident in Thomas’s discussions in the Summa Theologica, questions 4, 5, 6, on whether the creature can attain at all to God’s perfections.  In the Summa, however, man’s goodness is generally attributed to his nature, wherewith he was created, and the philosopher makes no further mention of any primary cause of man’s goodness.

 

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What conclusions are warranted now as to Thomas’s teachings on common grace?  First of all, the man in puris naturalibus as pronounced by Aquinas, and the man possessed of common grace as he is conjured up by the Christian Reformed Churches, are very much alike.  The man who is capable of civic righteousness differs little if any from the man who can fulfill the Law of God “as far as the substance of the work is concerned”; nor does the man who is restrained in his sin by an operation (not saving) of the Holy Ghost upon his heart differ much from the man who can avoid the mortal sins.

 

In the second place, it is evident that the man in puris naturalibus and the common grace man are arrived at by different means.  While Thomas denies completely that man became totally corrupt through the fall, the exponents of common grace agree that the first man would have been catapulted into the deepest corruption, and even claim that man would have changed into a devil, had not God intervened with His common grace.  The results of the two teachings are the same, but the means of arriving at the results differ, at least to some extent.

 

In the third place, we must observe the complete identity between the fundamental thesis of the first point of 1924 and Thomas’s teaching of a favorable attitude towards all men.

 

Fourthly, one cannot fail to note how similar the two heresies are when their mutual purposeless (in so far as the man in puris naturalibus and the object of common grace themselves are concerned) is considered.  Both the man in puris naturalibus and the common grace man are incapable to advancing one step from the respective positions.  Thomas, however, carries his theory to its logical end, doing violence to the doctrine of predestination by reducing, with his strong emphasis upon the natural and supernatural, the gulf between the elect and the reprobate to a mere difference of degree, and wiping out the sharp antitheses which mark the scriptural conception from Paul through Augustine and Calvin even to the present time.  This at least is in favor of Thomas: that he is honest, while the exponents of common grace refuse to admit the logical end of their heresy.

 

Finally, it may be said from an epistemological point of view that those who accuse us of being hard-headed logicians and rationalists might well tale stock of the class in which they are placed by their similarity to Aquinas, the “Christian Aristotle.”

 

In fine, what briefly, is the scriptural and Reformed teaching on this subject?

 

1. God created man in His own image (Gen. 1:26, 27).

 

2. The man created in God’s image was a rational-moral creature.  This is often referred to as the formal aspect of the image of God; also as man’s adaptability to the image of God.  This rational-moral nature man retained after the fall, although it was no longer adaptable to the image of God.

 

3. The material aspect of the image of God consists in true knowledge, righteousness, and holiness.  These were not dona superaddita, however, for the image of God was very really part of the being of man in the state of rectitude (Col. 3:10; Eph. 4:24).

 

4. Man was created with a free will, not so that he was independently free, nor yet free in the highest sense, for he was yet free to sin, also.

 

5. Without entering detailedly into the nature of sin, suffice it to say that sin presupposed a rational-moral being through which it could come to manifestation, and in which it can work as an active lack (privatio actuosa). (Rom. 8:7; Gal. 5:17).

 

6. The result of sin is twofold: in the first place, man died the spiritual death.  He not only lost God’s image, but the true knowledge became the life; the righteousness became unrighteousness; the holiness became unholiness.  Man became prophet, priest, and king of the devil.  The ethical working of his nature became nothing else than a working of death.  And if we speak of remnants of God’s image in man, we understand only that man in his sin can still see that he was created in (but lost irrevocably), and is yet commanded to live in righteousness, truth, and holiness (Ps. 14, 53, Rom. 3:9-18, 5:12ff., 8:5-8, and Eph. 2:1-3).

 

In the second place, man died the physical death, so that although death did not immediately take him, the power of death did take hold on all his members so that his life became “nothing but a continual death.”  And this temporal death is the beginning of eternal death, that is, the relation of the rational-moral man became instantly and everlastingly a relation of wrath in place of love.

 

This and this only is the teaching of Scripture on this score; no man in puris naturalibus; no common grace; only the sharp antitheses of good and evil, sin and grace, election and reprobation, love and wrath, the church and the world, salvation and damnation.

 

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