The following are every instance in Turretin’s Institutes of Elenctic Theology where he mentions a distinction between the “divided” and “compound” senses.
Note: not once
does he apply this distinction to the preaching of the gospel and God’s will for
the salvation of men, as “well-meant offer” men sometimes do. For instance,
nowhere does he state that God, according to a “divided sense,” “desires the
salvation of all men,” but in a “compound sense” “desires only the
salvation of the elect.”
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“The question is not whether the sacred writers (as men simply and in a divided sense) could err (for we readily grant this); or whether as holy men influenced by the Holy Spirit and in a compound sense, they did in fact err (for I think no one of the adversaries, except a downright atheist, would dare to say this). Rather the question is whether in writing they were so acted upon and inspired by the Holy Spirit (both as to the things themselves and as to the words) as to be kept free from all error and that their writings are truly authentic and divine. Our adversaries deny this; we affirm it” (Inst., vol. 1, pp. 62-63).
“It is not inconsistent (asystaton) for the same thing to be said to be possible and impossible at the same time (but as to different things [kat’ allo kai allo]): possible with respect to potency or the second cause (considered in itself and in a divided sense) and impossible relatively (on the hypothesis of the divine decree and foreknowledge). So it was possible for Christ not to be crucified, if God had so willed, and impossible on account of the decree. What therefore in the compound sense and on the supposition of the decree of God concerning the futurition of the thing was impossible not to take place; yet in the divided sense (and the decree being laid aside) was possible not to take place” (Inst., vol. 1, pp. 211).
“God could have made the past not to be the past in the divided sense and before it was past; but in the compound sense, he cannot make what is past to be not past because it is no less impossible for a thing to have been and not to have been at the same time than for it to be and not to be” (Inst., vol. 1, pp. 247).
“Although it might have been possible for this or that man to live longer (in the divided sense and apart from the decree of God), yet in the composite sense (and on the supposition of the decree), it was necessary for him to die in that particular place, time and manner. Although Lazarus would not have died if Christ had visited him while sick, yet it was divinely appointed that Christ should be absent that he might die” (Inst., vol. 1, pp. 327).
“Although man on his part in the divided sense can
fail, yet he cannot in the compound sense (as elected and called),
since indeed this very unrepentable (ametameleetos) election and calling
(by working in him irresistibly) gives him the power to will and perfect. It
keeps
him from ever repenting of the gift received by producing repentance not to be repented
of (ametameleeton, 2 Cor. 7:10)” (Inst.,
vol. 1, pp. 366).
“The elect can fail in the divided sense (considered as man in himself), but not in the compound sense as elected (considered relatively to the immutability of the divine decree and the invincible protection of God)” (Inst., vol. 1, pp. 370).
“The wise and upright man does not sin in the compound sense (and as such), but he can sin in the divided sense when he falls from the wisdom and righteousness bestowed upon him (which Adam did)” (Inst., vol. 1, pp. 469).
“… although what is predetermined is not any more indifferent to act or not to act in the second act and in the compound sense, yet it can always be indifferent in the first act and in the divided sense (as the will, when it determines itself, can still be in itself indifferent)” (Inst., vol. 1, pp. 508).
“… the power or faculty of Adam was so disposed through the mutable condition in which he had been created that it could be determined to evil no less than to good (but successively and in the divided sense, not at the same time and in the compound sense) which sad experience taught too well” (Inst., vol. 1, pp. 571).
“It was therefore possible for Adam not to sin in the divided sense and with regard to himself, but it was impossible in the compound sense, when viewed in relation to God’s decree and the permission of sin and the denial of grace” (Inst., vol. 1, pp. 611).
“… it is not inquired here concerning indifference in the first act or in a divided sense, as to simultaneity of power … We do not deny that the will of itself is so prepared that it can either elicit or suspend the act (which is the liberty of exercise and of contradiction) or be carried to both of opposite things (which is the liberty of contrariety and of specification). We also confess that the will is indifferent as long as the intellect remains doubtful and uncertain whither to turn itself. But concerning indifference in the second act and in a compound sense (as to simultaneity of power called active and subjective)—whether the will … is always so indifferent and undetermined that it can act or not act” (Inst., vol. 1, pp. 665-666).
“The principle of election can be in its own nature indifferent and undetermined in the divided sense—as to the first act and simultaneity of power; but not in the compound sense—as to the second act or the power of simultaneity” (Inst., vol. 1, p. 668).
“If Peter says, ‘The gospel was preached to the dead’ (1 Pet. 4:6*), this is not to be understood in the compound sense (as if he had preached to the dead as such because since they are not in the state of the way, they need no more any preaching), but in the divided sense (i.e., to them who are now dead, but who formerly lived when the gospel was preached to them)” (Inst., vol. 2, p. 359).
“Nor do they help themselves by saying that Christ did not die for the reprobate in a compound sense and formally (inasmuch as they are reprobate), but in a divided sense and materially (for those men who in another moment of the decree are reprobated). For in addition to our inability to conceive how such abstractions can belong to a unique and most simple act of the decree of God, it would thus follow that Christ could not die for the elect as such (here we reason by the rule of contraries)” (Inst., vol. 2, p. 469).
“Whosoever is bound to have justifying faith is bound to believe that Christ died for him. I deny that this is true of the immediate and direct act of faith; but I admit it to be true of the reflex and secondary act or in the compound sense (and the first act being presupposed), but not in the divided sense (and that first act being excluded)” (Inst., vol. 2, p. 479).
“The question does not concern the possibility of failing on man’s part and in a divided sense. For no one denies that believers considered in themselves as to the mutability and weakness of their nature, not only can fail, but could not help failing if left to themselves (especially on the approach of the temptations of Satan and of the world). But the question concerns the possibility of failing on God’s part, as to his purpose in the compound sense and with regard to the event itself. In this sense, we say their defection is impossible, not absolutely and simply, but hypothetically and relatively” (Inst., vol. 2, p. 594).
“Nor is it to be said here that the opinion of John is true in the compound sense, namely that he who is born of God cannot sin (inasmuch as he is born of God); still that he can sin in the divided sense, if he neglects the seed of God. For thus a causal is changed into a conditional” (Inst., vol. 2, p. 604).
“The passage—‘When the righteous turneth away from his righteousness, and committeth iniquity, all his righteousness that he hath done shall not be mentioned: in his sin that he hath sinned, in them shall he die’ (Ezk. 18:24)—does not favor the apostasy of saints. (1) It is hypothetical, not absolute; (bhshvbh tsdyq) ‘when the righteous turneth away’ (i.e., ‘if he turneth away’). However, it is known that a condition puts nothing in being, but denotes only a necessary connection of the antecedent with the consequent. If some possibility of defection be denoted on the part of man (when viewed in a divided sense), it cannot at once be inferred that there is a possibility in the compound sense on the part of the grace of God and as to the event. For what is possible with regard to the nearest and known cause is impossible with regard to the remote and hidden (which is in the decree of God)” (Inst., vol. 2, p. 612).
“It is one thing for a believer sinning grievously to be damnable
by his own merit (if regarded as to himself in a divided sense);
another, if considered in the compound sense and as to God’s
decree” (Inst., vol. 2, p. 614).
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Here are some quotes from his Institutes where he does respond to what is the theology of the “well-meant offer” (i.e., the notion that God desires the salvation of all men head for head bar none, and sends the gospel out with the intention of blessing all that outwardly hear it with salvation):
[1] “We now treat of the first head (viz., the will or universal purpose of having mercy upon all unto salvation). That there is no such will or purpose in God we prove: (1) from the decree of election and reprobation. Because the Scripture makes the purpose of having mercy particular, not universal (since it testifies that God had mercy upon some certain persons only, loves them and inscribes them in the book of life, but hates, hardens, appoints to wrath and ordains to condemnation others, Rom. 9:11, 12, 13, 18, 22; 1 Thess. 5:9; 1 Pet. 2:8). Who would say that God willed to pity unto salvation those who he reprobated from eternity; and most seriously intended for them the end under a condition, whom by the same act of will he excluded from the means of ever arriving at that end? And who does not see that the conditional purpose to give salvation to innumerable persons is destroyed by the absolute purpose concerning the not giving of faith to them?” (Institutes, vol. 1, p. 399, emphasis added).
[2] “Nor can it be said that the promises are universal of themselves and from the intention of God, inasmuch as God seriously wishes all to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth; but that all do not obtain it, is accidental on account of the wickedness and unbelief of men, who obstinately resist the Holy Spirit and hinder his operation. For it is falsely supposed that God seriously intends [i.e., desires] the salvation of all; this cannot be said of those whom he reprobated from eternity and to whom he wishes to give neither the gospel nor faith, without which the promise can neither be known nor received. (2) Although it is true that men resist the Holy Spirit and hinder his work, it is no less true that God does not furnish to all that grace by which the resistance of the heart may be taken away; that this is the special gift of God (Mt. 13:11; Rom. 11:7), which destroys the universality of the promise” (Institutes, vol. 2, p. 215, emphasis added).
[3] “God cannot in calling intend [i.e., desire] the salvation of those whom he reprobated from eternity and from whom he decreed to withhold faith and other means leading to salvation. Otherwise he would intend [or desire] what he knows is contrary to his own will and what he knew would never take place (and that it would not because he, who alone can, does not wish to do it.) This everyone sees to be repugnant to the wisdom, power and goodness of God” (Institutes, vol. 2, p. 505, emphasis added).
[4] “It is repugnant for
God ... to will and intend [i.e., desire] what he himself
decreed should never happen” (Institutes, vol. 2, p. 510, emphasis added).
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